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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis describes an approach to designing hazard avoidance alerting systems based on a 
Markov decision process (MDP) model of the alerting process, and shows its benefits over 
standard design methods.  One benefit of the MDP method is that it accounts for future decision 
opportunities when choosing whether or not to alert, or in determining resolution guidance.  
Another benefit is that it provides a means of modeling uncertain state information, such as 
knowledge about unmeasurable mode variables, so that decisions are more informed. 
 
A mode variable is an index for distinct types of behavior that a system exhibits at different 
times.  For example, in many situations normal system behavior is safe, but rare deviations from 
the normal increase the likelihood of a harmful incident.  Accurate modeling of mode 
information is needed to minimize alerting system errors such as unnecessary or late alerts. 
 
The benefits of the method are illustrated with two alerting scenarios where a pair of aircraft 
must avoid collisions when passing one another.  The first scenario has a fully observable state 
and the second includes an uncertain mode describing whether an intruder aircraft levels off 
safely above the evader or is in a hazardous blunder mode.   
 
In MDP theory, outcome preferences are described in terms of utilities of different state 
trajectories.  In keeping with this, alerting system requirements are stated in the form of a reward 
function.  This is then used with probabilistic dynamic and sensor models to compute an alerting 
logic (policy) that maximizes expected utility.  Performance comparisons are made between the 
MDP-based logics and alternate logics generated with current methods.  It is found that in terms 
of traditional performance measures (incident rate and unnecessary alert rate), the MDP-based 
logic can meet or exceed that of alternate logics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This document is based on the thesis of Lee F. Winder submitted to the Department of 
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Nomenclature 
 
Functions 
bs  Belief state 
E  Expected value 
O  Sensor function 
P  Probability 
R  Reward function 
T  State transition function 
U  State expected utility 
Uτ  Trajectory utility 
 
Scalar Parameters and Variables 
a  Alerting system action 
a0  Deferral (nominal) action 
ap  Previous action 
AS  Alert status index 
ASp  Previous alert status 
BS  Belief state index 
CS  Combination state index 
D  Nominal vertical level-off separation 
c  Number of policy or value iterations 
γ  Reward discounting factor 
k  Discrete time index 
m  Mode variable, also number of utility recursions 
mi  Index of the ith mode 
n  Number of states in situation state space, S 
q  Number of actions in alert action space, A 
t  Time 
tc  Current time 
∆t  Time increment 
UCR  Correct rejection utility 
USA  Successful alert utility 
UUA  Unnecessary alert utility 
vclimb  Constant evasion climb rate 
vclosing  Constant horizontal closing rate 
vdescent  Constant nominal intruder descent rate 
vw  Climb rate disturbance input 
x  Horizontal separation 
xf  Final horizontal separation 
xp  Previous horizontal separation 
∆x  Horizontal position increment 
y  Vertical separation 
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yf  Final vertical separation 
yp  Previous vertical separation 
 
Sets 
A  Alert space 
H
  Hazard space 
O
  Observation space 
S
  Situation space 
 
Trajectories 
τ  A trajectory in S 
τa  A trajectory of alerting actions 
 
Vectors 
a  Vector alert action signal 
ak  kth alert action 
dh  Disturbance input to humans 
dp  Disturbance input to plant 
ns  Sensor noise input 
o  Alerting system observations of situation 
s  Situation state 
u  Human input to plant 
xa  Alerting system state 
xh  Human state 
xp  Plant state 
y  Human observations of plant 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Hazard Avoidance Alerting 
 Automatic alerting systems are often included in situations where humans interact 
with machines, such as in vehicles and industrial processes, and unnoticed failures can 
have serious consequences.  An alerting system monitors a situation and, when necessary, 
generates alerts and other signals to prevent an undesirable incident.  It can be as simple 
as an alarm triggered by an out-of-range sensor reading, but in recent years more 
complex alerting systems have appeared that gather comprehensive information, use 
sophisticated decision algorithms, and provide guidance to aid the human operator after 
the initial alert.  Such systems are possible thanks to increasing availability of the needed 
sensor, communications and computer technology.  Examples of successful alerting 
systems are the mid-air collision (Harman, 1989; O’Hara, 1998; Nordwall, 2002) and 
terrain (Phillips, 2001; Feith, 2002) avoidance systems installed in many aircraft cockpits.  
New alerting systems are frequently created or proposed, especially in aviation where 
they help counteract the negative safety effects of increasing use of airports and airspace, 
and reduced separation requirements (Scott, 2001; Jones, 2002; Cassell et al, 2001; 
Carpenter & Kuchar, 1997; Samanant et al, 2000; Zhao & Rock, 2002). 
An alerting system takes a stream of state measurements as input, and by some 
mathematical criteria or logic decides whether or not to alert.  If an alert has already 
happened, the logic decides what additional cues to give the operator.  Designing the 
logic traditionally means choosing a candidate logic, evaluating its performance with 
simulated scenarios, making changes to fix problems, and repeating the process.  The 
final logic may be significantly different or more complicated than the original due to 
cumulative improvements. 
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The initial candidate logic can be chosen in different ways.  One common 
approach is to think of the threshold as a boundary between normal and abnormal system 
behavior, so the alert indicates a loss of conformance.  An example is the “rumble strips” 
along the edges of many highways that alert a driver whose vehicle may be drifting off of 
the road.  A more complex approach to alerting is to predict the trajectory of state 
variables and issue an alert if the future proximity of the hazard calls for it.  Typically 
these predictive alerting logics use a rough trajectory model (e.g. not taking prediction 
uncertainties into account) in conjunction with a state space hazard model and limits on 
prediction time to avoid alerting too early.  Though reasoning explicitly about the 
potential hazard, such a logic still requires performance analysis and tuning, since the 
model only roughly describes the conditions justifying an alert (Yang & Kuchar, 2002).  
Appendix B has a more complete discussion of these different philosophies of alerting. 
Recent research has produced design methods where alerting decisions are made 
based on metrics of predicted decision performance at that time, rather than on rough 
criteria (Yang & Kuchar, 2002; Kuchar & Yang, 2000).  The aim is to reduce the need for 
trial and error adjustment of a logic by more clearly stating the alerting requirements, and 
making more informed alerting decisions in the knowledge of these.  In systems with 
random dynamics, where only uncertain state predictions are possible, the required 
decision metrics tend to be probabilistic quantities (e.g. incident frequencies or 
probabilities of future incidents).   
Motivated by two new design considerations to be introduced next, this thesis 
continues in the vein of probabilistic prediction-based alerting, with the goals of 
improving alerting system performance and providing insight into alerting problems. 
1.2 Modes and Future Decisions 
In many cases a specific event can be identified (such as equipment failure or an 
operator error) as triggering a change in the dynamics of an observed human-controlled 
system, so that different models describe its behavior better at different times.  In 
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particular, the event may mark a change from safe to unsafe system behavior.  An 
example is a vehicle on a highway becoming dangerous after its driver falls asleep. 
Distinct dynamic behaviors a system can exhibit are termed modes.  Figure 1.1 
illustrates the mode idea for an aircraft in a situation where it could either crash into a 
mountain top (1) or climb safely over it (2), depending on the vertical path mode being  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Uncertain Situation Modes 
used by the aircraft’s autoflight system.  Uncertainty about which mode the aircraft is in 
makes it unclear whether an alert is needed:  alerting with mode 2 might cause an 
irritating, unnecessary alert if the human is already aware of the mountain, but failing to 
alert with mode 1 could allow a crash.  Due to the general difficulty of avoiding all such 
errors in the presence of uncertainty (Kuchar, 1996), the alerting system may be forced to 
weigh the costs of different errors and make a probability trade-off between the two.  Or 
the alerting system might take steps to reduce the mode uncertainty to allow more exact 
predictions and better decisions.  One objective of this thesis is to discuss the modeling of 
mode uncertainty, and show the benefits of a Bayesian probabilistic approach to mode 
uncertainty modeling. 
 A related issue is how knowledge about the system dynamics is used to achieve 
the goals of alerting.  This includes taking into account for the current alerting decision 
the fact that there will be new information available in the future, and future choices to 
make.  Figure 1.2 illustrates this issue, again using the aircraft and terrain example.  
Initially the alerting system is uncertain about the operating mode of the aircraft and it 
must decide whether or not to alert, triggering a climb avoidance maneuver, or defer the 
alert for possible use later.  If it issues an alert immediately the alert would be safe but 
 
1 
2 
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Figure 1.2: Anticipating New Information and Decision Opportunities 
maybe unnecessary.  Because future observations will reduce uncertainty about the mode, 
deferring the alert would clarify the need for an alert once the path branching point b is 
passed.  The path taken would make the actual mode apparent.  If the collision path were 
taken, then alerting would not risk an unnecessary alert.  If deferring would also leave 
time for a safe avoidance maneuver, then it makes sense to defer the alert.  Typically, 
however, there is no clear branching point like point b in actual situations, making the 
decision to defer alerting more challenging.  There is an interesting balance between 
acting early on uncertain information, ensuring safety but maybe unnecessarily, versus 
delaying action to better know the mode being used and loosing flexibility for avoiding a 
threat.  Investigating the benefits of such reasoning in an alerting system, but in a more 
general probabilistic framework, is the second thesis objective. 
1.3 Thesis Overview 
 This thesis presents a new methodology for the design of hazard avoidance 
alerting, motivated by certain needs not yet addressed by existing design and analysis 
methods.  One need is to incorporate reasoning about future decision opportunities into 
an alerting and guidance logic.  Another is to include reasoning about uncertain, 
unobservable dynamic modes in the logic.  In both cases there is also a need to determine 
any benefits of such information.  Finally, there must be an approach to using the desired 
information in a way that is efficient enough that alerting decisions can be made in real 
time. 
 Chapter 2 gives an overview of probabilistic prediction-based alerting and 
provides more detailed motivation for the two new considerations.  This includes 
Immediate alert Deferred alert 
b 
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formally defining model components and showing how different metrics of performance 
are used for defining and analyzing alerting thresholds. 
 Chapter 3 contains a review of related research, pointing out similarities to other 
work and significant differences that make this work necessary. 
 Chapter 4 covers the basics of Markov decision process (MDP) theory in the 
context of alerting, using model components defined in chapter 2.  After formulating the 
problem, some basic methods of deriving efficient “policy” solutions are described.  
After this the use of partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) to model 
uncertain modes is discussed, along with a basic POMDP solution method.  Finally, some 
considerations about humans in the system are discussed. 
 Chapter 5 uses an aircraft collision avoidance alerting process to illustrate MDP 
alerting concepts.  A policy is derived that defines the alerting threshold and also 
generates guidance to maximize safety after the alert.  The modeling of alerting 
preferences in terms of a reward function is shown.  Finally, the need for average as well 
as threshold performance metrics (utilities) is discussed. 
 Chapter 6 uses a more complex, 2-mode collision avoidance alerting process to 
look at modeling uncertain modes and updating of uncertain knowledge based on 
observations.  The benefit of such modeling is shown using specific scenarios and metrics 
of average performance.  Finally, the use of belief state domain simplifications is 
discussed. 
 In Chapter 7 the main conclusions and contributions are summarized. 
 22 
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2. Probabilistic Alerting Overview and 
Thesis Motivation 
 
 This chapter describes in detail two new concepts for guiding the design of 
probabilistic alerting systems.  One is belief modeling of uncertain mode variables.  This 
is a method for describing uncertainty about which of multiple dynamic modes an 
observed system is in.  Another is anticipating future information gathering and decision 
opportunities when choosing an alerting system action.  Section 2.1 describes the alerting 
process and modeling assumptions in general.  Then section 2.2 covers the different 
measures of alerting system performance.  In section 2.3 the use of probabilistic 
trajectory prediction to define the alerting logic and achieve specific performance 
requirements is discussed.  This leads into an argument in section 2.4 for the importance 
of mode belief modeling and for considering future decisions when making the current 
alerting decision. 
2.1 Probabilistic Alerting Process Model1 
2.1.1 Components and Influences 
Figure 2.1 depicts the alerting process using the notation of multivariable systems 
theory.  Blocks represent physical elements, and arrows indicate the influences they have 
on one another.  An element that changes with time is characterized by a set of variables 
called the state vector or state of the element.  For example, the state of an n-variable 
element at time t is: 
                                                 
1
 The process and hazard model and the terminology described in this chapter are similar to those used by 
Kuchar (Kuchar, 1995; Kuchar, 1996). 
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x(t) = [ x1(t)   x2(t)  …  xn(t) ]T (2.1) 
Scalars, including time and the state variables, are italicized, while vectors are in 
boldface.  This is the convention throughout this thesis.  Another notational practice is to 
sometimes truncate the labels of parameters with understood dependencies:  e.g.  x(t) 
represented by x. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Alerting Process 
 The alerting system, represented by the leftmost element, is a dynamic system 
with a state, xa.2  It makes observations o and sends inputs a to some situation composed 
of humans and a plant they control.  The humans and plant are both dynamic systems 
with state vectors xh and xp respectively.  The situation is itself a dynamic system with an 
overall state vector s, made up of the human and plant states.  For a physical example, 
the situation might be highway traffic, including multiple human drivers, their vehicles, 
and the road they travel on.  In that case, the humans are in one block, and the vehicles 
and road form the plant. 
                                                 
2
 For example, the alerting system state could be an estimate of the current situation state. 
 
 
 
Sensors 
u(t) a(t) 
y(t) o(t) 
Situation state:  s(t) = { xh(t), xp(t) } 
Plant 
Disturbances 
dp(t)  Humans 
 
xh(t) 
 
Alerting System 
 
xa(t) 
 
Plant 
 
xp(t) 
 
Sensor noise 
ns(t)  
Human 
Disturbances 
dh(t)  
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 The humans make observations y of the plant and perform actions u to control it.  
The observations y and o are the output of a sensors element.  This element is a function 
of s that describes which part of the plant state is actually observable to the humans and 
the alerting system.  Sensors may also provide information about the humans themselves, 
as shown.  The humans receive an alerting system signal a, which can include both 
discrete alert values (alerts in the conventional sense) and any continuous resolution 
guidance the alerting system might provide. 
Imperfections in the situation model result in observed state dynamics different 
from what is expected from the model.  Such errors are represented in the diagram by 
disturbance and noise inputs.  The human and plant models are subject to disturbances, 
dh and dp respectively, each a vector the same size as the corresponding state.  The 
sensor outputs y and o are corrupted by random noise that can include bias and high 
frequency noise components.  This is shown as the input vector ns, which is the 
combined size of the two sensor outputs. 
Note that even though humans are ultimately controlling the plant, the model 
presented here focuses on the effects of the alerting system on the overall situation 
(human and plant).  In a sense, from the alerting system’s point of view, the human and 
plant can be collectively considered as the controlled element.  The design issues then 
revolve around how to design the alerting system so that the human and plant system 
responds in an acceptable manner. 
2.1.2 Incidents and Hazards 
 The state s changes with time according to the internal situation dynamics and the 
effects of any alerting system input to the situation.  The purpose of the alerting system is 
to protect against an incident by influencing the path s takes in its space, S.  The space S 
is the set of all possible states and is termed the situation space.  An incident is some 
negative event that can happen within the situation, such as an accident, rule violation or 
mechanical failure. 
 
 26 
As the state changes with time, there is some probability of an incident happening 
over a given interval traveled.  The probability is different for different paths that s can 
take, as figure 2.2 shows for a 2-dimensional state space.  From the current state s(tc) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Incident Dependence on the Situation Trajectory
 
 
two future paths (τ1 and τ2) are possible, beginning at the current state and continuing 
through time t1.  Each path has a different incident probability.  A complete description of 
the situation must include a model specifying these probabilities.  The model should give 
incident probabilities for any possible future path segment beginning at any possible s.  
A common approach is to specify a hazardous region or hazard space within S, and 
assume an incident happens with probability 1 if the state trajectory enters hazard space, 
and 0 otherwise.  Figure 2.3 illustrates this kind of incident model in the 2-variable state 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Example Incident Model 
 
s1 
s2 
s(tc) 
S 
P(Incident | τ1)  =  P1 
P(Incident | τ2)  =  P2 
s1(t1) 
τ1 
τ2 s2(t1) 
H 
s(t) trajectory 
Hazard 
S 
Incident 
s2 
s1 
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space, with H labeling the hazard space.  These incident modeling issues were identified 
and discussed in more detail by Kuchar (Kuchar, 1995). 
2.1.3 Situation Dynamics 
 The situation is assumed to have uncertain dynamics.  That is, knowledge of s at 
a given time does not allow an exact prediction of future states.  It is further assumed that 
the uncertainty is amenable to probabilistic modeling.  In terms of the variables already 
defined, this means that, given s at the current time tc, the state after some time interval 
∆t for a known control input τa (a trajectory of a(t)) over that interval is known within 
some probability distribution over the states in S.  The dynamics can be expressed as a 
distribution T(⋅,⋅) conditioned on the initial state and control trajectory: 
s(tc+∆t) = T( s(tc), τa ) (2.2) 
This future-state distribution is called the transition function (Russell & Norvig).  Note 
that the distribution of the future state has no dependence on states prior to s(tc).  In other 
words, the assumption is that no information affecting the prediction is lost by forgetting 
past states.  By satisfying this condition, the state s is said to exhibit the Markov 
property, in the probabilistic sense of the term (Russell & Norvig). 
The value of a(t), chosen by the alerting system, could be a real-valued vector in 
general, but in practice is sometimes limited to a small set of possibilities: 
a(t) ∈ { a0, a1, a2, ... an } (2.3) 
This may be preferable or necessary due to limitations of the alerting display, or in a 
human’s ability to track and follow a command signal (Wickens, 1992).  For example, in 
an impending car accident scenario where the time to predicted collision is short, a hard 
braking command might be more realistic than complicated instructions to steer around 
an obstacle.  Since a hazard alerting system is meant for rare interventions only, one 
possible action is the nominal or deferral action, which is really the lack of an alert.  The 
deferral action is represented by a0. 
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Figure 2.4 illustrates probabilistic prediction uncertainty for a situation with a 
known current state and some implied control signal beginning at tc.  While s(tc) is 
known exactly, s(tc+∆t) has a distribution of possible states, with darker shading 
indicating a greater likelihood of the state being at that point.  An effect of the trajectory 
uncertainty is that whether or not future events happen—such as crossing through hazard 
space—is also uncertain.  For the process shown, there is some probability of the state 
being inside H at each point in time, and a probability of s passing through H over all 
time.  These could be calculated numerically, such as with Monte Carlo simulation, if not 
analytically. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Probabilistic Prediction Uncertainty 
The probabilistic dynamics and Markov state assumptions are consistent with 
existing methods of design and analysis of alerting systems (Carpenter & Kuchar, 1997; 
Yang & Kuchar, 1997, 2002; Kuchar, 1996).  While such modeling applies to alerting 
logic analysis, more relevant to this thesis are design methods where the alerting decision 
logic is defined in terms of decision metrics computed from a probabilistic prediction 
model.  The reasoning behind such an approach is that it can lead more directly to a logic 
with the desired performance than trial and error design methods (Yang & Kuchar, 2002). 
2.1.4 Situation Observability 
To determine how decision options will affect future events, the alerting system 
uses available knowledge about the current situation state.  It may not know the exact 
state, but have limited information that some states are more likely than others.  The less 
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uncertainty there is, the more accurate predictions can be and the more effective its 
decisions are likely to be.  When state uncertainty is large, the alerting system can reduce 
it by incorporating information from new observations o of the situation into its existing 
knowledge.  An observation is a direct measurement of the current situation (e.g. reading 
a thermometer or other sensor of a physical quantity) (Russell & Norvig). 
An ideal observation provides sufficient information to determine the exact and 
entire current value of s.  When this is possible, the state is said to be fully observable 
(Russell & Norvig).  There is no requirement that the variables in s be directly measured.  
It may be more convenient or realistic to measure a different vector o that can be 
transformed into the value of s.  For example, in figure 2.5 the relative position of the 
two aircraft might be defined as one pair of variables { xm, ym } (2.5a), but easier to 
determine by measuring a different, equivalent, pair { r, θ } (2.5b) that can be 
transformed into the other variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: State-Observation Relationship 
As mentioned in section 2.1.1, an ideal observation of the state is not always 
possible.  One reason is that imperfect sensors can add random measurement errors.  The 
uncertainty due to such errors is often modeled in terms of probability distributions over 
the space of o or observation space, O.  This kind of observation uncertainty is pictured 
in figure 2.6a, assuming no state knowledge beforehand (i.e. a uniform state distribution 
on the x-y plane). 
 
ym
 
xm
 
y
 
x
 
r
 
y
 
x
 
θ
 
(a) (b) 
s = { x, y } 
 
o = { r, θ } 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Sources of Observation Uncertainty 
Even without measurement error, full observability can fail to hold if there are too 
few variables in o to determine the current s.  For example, in figure 2.6b the observation 
is reduced to o = { r }, with r exactly measurable and θ unmeasurable, resulting in a locus 
of possible states all equally likely.  Effectively, the measurement error of θ is uniformly 
distributed if there was no prior knowledge about the variable.  If either missing-sensor or 
sensor-error uncertainty limit the observation, the state is termed partially observable 
(Russell & Norvig). 
Assuming o consists of measured variables with probabilistic error uncertainty, 
the relationship between the current state and observation of the state is denoted by the 
sensor function (Russell & Norvig): 
o(tc) = O( s(tc) ) (2.4) 
The function O(⋅) is a probability distribution over the space of possible measurements O, 
conditional on the current state, s(tc). 
2.2 Alerting System Performance 
 There are three main aspects of alerting system performance:  the system’s ability 
to avoid unsuccessful alerts, unnecessary alerts and improper alerts. 
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An unsuccessful alert is defined as any alert that is followed by an incident (Yang 
& Kuchar, 1997).  An example would be receiving a collision warning so late that there is 
not enough time to actually avoid a collision (a late alert (LA)). 
An unnecessary alert (UA) occurs when no incident would have occurred had 
there been no alert (Yang & Kuchar, 1997).  This category is relevant because, in calling 
for an avoidance response, an unnecessary alert interferes with the human operator’s 
achievement of goals, such as maximizing productivity or minimizing time-to-completion 
of a task.  In addition, an unnecessary alert can actually lead to an incident (an induced 
incident (II) (Carpenter & Kuchar, 1997)) that would not have happened otherwise.  For 
example, in maneuvering to avoid an incorrectly predicted collision with one car, a driver 
could crash into another.  Note that a successful alert can be either necessary or 
unnecessary:  these alerts are not mutually exclusive events. 
An improper alert (IA) is an alerting system action perceived as erroneous by a 
human operator.  This could happen for different reasons.  For example, the alert might 
be known or believed to be unnecessary or premature (a nuisance alert (NA)).  Another 
possibility is that the alert is issued later than preferred (or not at all).  Improper alerts, 
particularly nuisance alerts, are a problem because experiencing these over time can 
cause an operator to mistrust the alerting system and become less likely to conform to 
alerts and guidance.  This issue was studied in the context of aircraft collision avoidance 
by Pritchett (Pritchett & Hansman, 1997).  In principle, an improper alert can also be an 
unnecessary alert, an unsuccessful alert, both, or neither.  Figure 2.7 illustrates the 
possible interdependencies of the three error events with a Venn diagram.  Drawn this 
way, an ideal alerting system would never operate inside the ellipses:  every alert would 
be proper, necessary and successful.  But as will be discussed, a more realistic goal is not 
to achieve an ideal alerting system, but one with an acceptable trade-off between different 
error types. 
Whereas unsuccessful and unnecessary alerts are clearly and objectively defined, 
improper alerts are more ambiguous because of the difficulty of understanding or 
predicting operator preferences.  By some means, however, they must be addressed, and 
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preferably at an early stage in design.  Otherwise, they will have to be dealt with through 
trial and error with test subjects or user feedback. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Alerting Performance Aspects 
Alerting system performance can be quantified using probabilities or frequencies 
of the three error events.  The frequencies of unnecessary alerts and incidents 
(unsuccessful alerts3) in particular are common metrics of overall performance.  The 
performance of the alerting system in a given trajectory scenario can be described in 
terms of the conditional probabilities of the different events at the time of the alert: 
P( Unsuccessful Alert | s is at Threshold ) (2.5) 
P( Unnecessary Alert | s is at Threshold ) (2.6) 
P( Improper Alert | s is at Threshold ) (2.7) 
For any of the error events it is best to have a low probability or frequency, but 
due to uncertainty in the situation dynamics, it is usually impossible to optimize all 
metrics at the same time.  For instance, adjusting the logic to minimize the probability of 
an unnecessary alert tends to increase the probability of an unsuccessful alert, 
necessitating a trade-off between the two.  One way to visualize this trade-off is with a 
System Operating Characteristic (SOC) plot as in figure 2.8 (Kuchar 1995, 1996). 
 
                                                 
3
 If an incident happens before there is an alert, the alert can be thought of as happening at the time of the 
incident { 0, 0 } (Winder & Kuchar, 1999). 
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Figure 2.8: System Operating Characteristic Plot 
A point on the SOC plane is a plot of the successful alert probability (1 minus the 
unsuccessful alert probability) against the unnecessary alert probability at a given time.  
The operating point at the moment an alert is triggered (when s is at the threshold) is a 
measure of alerting performance for that particular scenario.  The curve shown 
corresponds to a hypothetical situation trajectory that ends in an incident along the 
nominal trajectory if no alert ever occurs.  The point traces a path from the upper right 
corner toward the left as the incident becomes increasingly likely.  If evasive action is 
taken early on, the probability of avoiding the incident is high, as is the probability that 
the alert is unnecessary.  As the alert is deferred, the probability that it would be safe or 
unnecessary decreases.  Ultimately, if the alert is deferred for too long, the incident 
becomes unavoidable due to the limitations of escape options, and the operating point 
goes to (0, 0).  The ideal place for an alert to occur is at the upper left corner, where the 
alert is known to be necessary and there is no chance of an incident when the alert occurs.  
Realistic systems tend not to occupy this point, but a designer may try to achieve alerting 
points as near to it as possible (Yang & Kuchar, 1997).  The nearness that can be 
achieved depends on the predictability of the situation and the effectiveness of escape 
options. 
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For SOC points below the diagonal line an alert would be more likely to cause a 
collision than prevent one.  At the diagonal the alerting system is equally likely to cause a 
collision as prevent one.  So at minimum, alerts should occur over the diagonal. 
 An SOC plot can also be used as an analysis tool to help visualize the overall 
performance of an alerting system (Winder & Kuchar, 1999).  Whereas in the previous 
discussion the SOC point was an incident probability at the threshold, the coordinates can 
also be defined as the global successful and unnecessary alert averages resulting from a 
set of alerting process trajectories.  This use will be important in later chapters. 
2.3 Probabilistic Prediction-Based Alerting 
Figure 2.9 redraws the alerting process with the alerting system’s inner process 
broken down into two phases:  belief state updating and the action logic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Alerting System Structure 
2.3.1 Belief State Updating 
The Belief Updating block is a process of assimilating the stream of observations 
of the situation into a probability distribution, bs(t), describing the overall uncertainty of 
the current state.  Even if each observation has great uncertainty due to the reasons 
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described earlier, the combined evidence of many observations over time, plus 
knowledge about the nature of observation errors, of the situation dynamics, and of 
alerting actions taken, will tend to reduce current-state uncertainty.  Because probabilistic 
state uncertainty can also be thought of as the knowledge or reasonable beliefs about the 
state, the distribution bs is called the belief state (Russell & Norvig). 
Probability theory describes the process of incorporating evidence into the belief 
state (“filtering” (Russell & Norvig)) using the sensor and transition functions that were 
defined in section 2.1.  This process is described in appendix A.  Thus, these two 
functions are included in figure 2.9 as inputs to the belief updating process, along with 
the observations and past alerting actions.  Depending on the situation, belief filtering can 
be a computationally intensive and time-consuming process.  But for special cases of the 
sensor and transition functions, efficient numerical algorithms exist that make hardware 
implementation of the process more practical.  For example, Kalman filtering is a 
common technique that produces a valid state distribution when sensor errors are 
Gaussian noise and the state dynamics can be expressed as linear equations.  Such 
algorithms are common in alerting system design. 
2.3.2 Performance Metric-Based Alerting 
The Action Logic in figure 2.9 uses the current belief state and the prediction 
model to choose an alerting action.  As shown, it can also take the previous action as an 
input.  Most of the time the alerting system operates in the background, monitoring the 
state for conditions that justify an alert.  During that time the action logic should suggest 
a deferral action, a0 (section 2.1.3), because intervention is not yet warranted.  Once an 
alert happens, the logic continues to monitor the state, now using gathered information to 
best guide the human operators in avoiding an incident. 
 In prediction-based alerting, the logic chooses its actions based on the relative 
quality of predicted outcomes for each option.  The option that would have the best result 
(according to some value scheme) is chosen over the others.  Predicting outcomes 
requires the current-state distribution and the state transition model.  The incident model, 
introduced in section 2.1.2, is also required at this stage.  As they are determined by 
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probabilistic process model components, outcome predictions are themselves 
probabilistic quantities.  For example, for a particular sequence of actions it is possible to 
calculate the probabilities of future events such as hazard encounters, or the probability 
that an alert issued now would be an unnecessary alert. 
As discussed in section 2.2, such probabilities are basic measures of the 
performance of the alerting threshold.  When these quantities are computed in real time 
within the alerting system, and known at the time an alert happens, the performance of 
the threshold for that scenario is directly controllable with the decision.  For example, in 
Figure 2.10 an airborne alerting system monitors the nominal probability of crashing into 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Performance Metric Threshold 
a mountain, and defers alerting until reaching a threshold probability that the alert is 
needed to avert a collision.  Generally there are requirements on safety of the escape 
maneuver (successful alert probability) too, so that there may be a defined region in the 
SOC space where alerts are acceptable if they occur, and outside of which they are not.  
time 
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The idea of probabilistic prediction-based hazard avoidance alerting is to define the 
alerting logic directly in terms of predictive metrics such as these, and the path they take 
through the metric space, as figure 2.11 illustrates (Yang & Kuchar, 1997, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: SOC Alert Threshold 
2.4 New Design Considerations 
 This thesis looks at two new design considerations for prediction-based alerting, 
and their effects on performance.  In this section the considerations are identified, and 
their anticipated importance is explained in relation to current design practices. 
2.4.1 Mode Beliefs 
 The situation state, s, was described in section 2.1 as a set of variables that 
satisfies the Markov property, so that probabilistic predictions can be made based on the 
current state.  These are most often real-valued variables representing physical quantities 
like distance or speed.  Another kind of variable, termed a mode, is of particular interest 
in this thesis.  A mode is a variable having a discrete domain, and whose value tends to 
persist over long intervals of time.  The mode serves to index a set of distinct behaviors 
that the situation can exhibit at different times.  These can be expressed as a set of 
transition functions (expression 2.8), one for each possible mode, mi.  For example, 
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figure 2.12 redraws the terrain collision scenario from chapter 1 in probabilistic form.  
Though future states are uncertain in either mode, in one the aircraft will nominally tend 
to crash into the mountain, and in the other it will tend to climb over it, as separate 
probabilistic transition functions can describe.  In general, a mode’s value at a given time 
can be a deterministic function of inputs or other state variables (e.g. an autopilot tracking 
mode at a known setting), or a random process (e.g. pilot mental lapse, weather 
conditions).  The mode can be observable or unobservable by the alerting system, but 
only the latter case is of interest in this thesis. 
 
  T1( s(tc), τa ),           mi = m1 (2.8) 
s(tc+∆t) =    T2( s(tc), τa ),                  m2  
 
  Tn( s(tc), τa ),              … mn  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Transition Function Indexing with a Mode Variable 
 When there are mode variables in the situation state, the filtering process 
described in section 2.3 still applies, resulting in a belief state description of mode 
uncertainty.  In this case the belief state is a discrete probability distribution.  Even if no 
direct measurement of a mode variable is possible, the estimation process will infer 
information about the mode through its known influence on the transition function.  This 
is similar to using a filter to estimate speed from repeated position measurements when 
speed is not directly measurable:  the equation relating the two allows observations of one 
to improve knowledge about the other. 
m1 
m2 
tc 
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 The action logic part of the alerting system uses the total belief state at the current 
time, bs(t), to make predictions for each possible alerting action.  Note that there are two 
contributors of uncertainty in predicted states:  current-state uncertainty (the belief state) 
and inherent prediction uncertainty due to the transition function.  The uncertainty of the 
predicted state increases with an increase in either component.  Figure 2.13 shows the 
effect of increasing belief state uncertainty on the distribution of predicted states.  In a 
case where the uncertainty contribution of one source is small, neglecting that uncertainty 
(i.e. replacing the distribution with a single assumed value) may have little effect on the 
overall prediction uncertainty, and be a reasonable approximation to make.  This 
simplification is commonly done with the output of filtering processes, where the 
intention is usually to find a best estimate of the state value rather than a full uncertainty 
description.  For example, the mean value or maximum-likelihood value of the belief 
state might be taken as the estimate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Effect of Current-State Uncertainty on Predictions 
 As figure 2.14 illustrates, with a 1-dimensional state, that a distribution with a 
sufficiently small variance (2.14a) can ensure that errors due to a state approximation 
nearly always remain within specified bounds of acceptability.  If the filtering process 
leaves large enough uncertainties in the state, as with the broad distribution in (2.14b), 
state estimation error becomes unacceptable. 
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 As with continuous variables, a maximum-likelihood approximation can be used 
to estimate a mode from its distribution.  This means assuming that the present mode is 
the one with the highest probability.  This assumed mode can then be used to predict 
future outcomes, which might allow easier decision metric computation or even 
avoidance of computations if certain modes are known in advance to be safe or unsafe.  
This suggests a specialized version of the alerting process where the alerting decision is 
based on a hypothesis test on the current mode belief state rather than on explicit 
prediction of the future effects of the current state. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: State Approximations 
 Because belief updating can be complicated and slow in some cases, another 
inclination might be to avoid the Bayes updating process by leaving the belief state or 
part of the belief state (over some but not all uncertain variables) fixed at a single 
distribution.  This could be a viable option in some cases, if the simplifications are 
justifiable using known transition and sensor function properties. 
2.4.2 Anticipating Knowledge Gain and Decision Opportunities 
 Up to now the only assumptions about the action logic of the alerting system are 
that it makes use of a current belief state for the situation, an incident model and 
probabilistic state predictions to generate metrics for comparing possible actions.  Based 
on existing alerting methods there are different ways to proceed.  These will be described 
and compared next, along with a new method of planning with possible benefits over the 
existing options. 
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 The simplest way to use state predictions in planning is to base action choices on 
the predicted outcomes of one or more maneuvers.  A maneuver policy will refer to a 
predetermined control law that maps any belief state, bs, into an alert action, a.  A 
maneuver is the state trajectory resulting from repeatedly using a single maneuver policy 
to generate the alerting action.  Figure 2.15 illustrates the maneuver idea for the extreme 
case (for simplicity) of no prediction or current-state uncertainty.  The maneuvers shown 
include the nominal maneuver (N), where the maneuver policy is to take the nominal 
action regardless of bs, and possible escape maneuvers (Ei).  Each escape maneuver 
policy, when used repeatedly, causes the system to seek some state goal.  For example, 
one maneuver policy for an aircraft could involve achieving a certain heading or climb 
rate, so repeated use of the maneuver would cause convergence to that goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Planning with Maneuvers 
 For each maneuver there is some probability of an incident occurring.  The action 
decision is made by optimizing or satisficing a cost function defined in terms of the 
probabilities of future events.  For example, prior to any alert the rule might be to issue 
the alert if the probability of an incident along the nominal trajectory exceeds some 
threshold (as in figure 2.10).  Or, it could be based on a maximum allowable probability 
of an incident for the available escape maneuvers, where reaching a minimum safety 
level triggers the alert, as done in (Carpenter & Kuchar, 1997).  It could also be a rule 
using both nominal and escape maneuver predictions. 
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After an alert happens, the simplest approach is to use the safest maneuver, and 
cease any further planning.  Then there are no further choices to make, and the resulting 
probability of an incident will be as predicted at the time of the alert for that maneuver.  
For the most predictable evasion performance, the maneuver may take the form of an 
understood procedure the human operators rehearse, so that no display or interpretation 
of complex guidance is needed after the alert (e.g. evacuation procedures for fire alarms 
in a building).  In aviation alerting this was assumed during development of the AILS 
collision avoidance logic for close parallel approaches (Winder & Kuchar, 1999; 
Samanant et al, 2000), where the tactical nature of the alerts made quick and precise 
execution of escape maneuvers important. 
 A more flexible use of maneuver policies is allowing the alerting system to switch 
between maneuvers (replan) even after an alert occurs.  This gives the alerting system 
greater freedom in acting to attain its objectives, but the method of choosing the next 
action becomes less clear.  Probably the most obvious approach is to choose the 
maneuver resulting from a fixed maneuver policy assumption as before, but to repeat the 
decision at later times, each time using the maneuver policy for the maneuver that is 
predicted to be safest.  This could result in a sequence of maneuver segments such as 
shown in figure 2.16.  Note that there is an inconsistency in assuming that the maneuver  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Replanning with Maneuvers 
policy is fixed when in fact it can be changed later (the fixed-maneuver logic of figure 
2.15 has this same inconsistency, since choosing the nominal maneuver does not actually 
force a nominal trajectory to be followed in the future).  However, the escape maneuver 
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replanning method can still decrease the probability of an incident over that of the fixed-
maneuver planning method once an alert has occurred, making it a safer method while 
not increasing the unnecessary alert rate.  The method has been used in alerting 
systems—for example, by the TCAS logic in the post-alert phase (RTCA, 1983; Harman, 
1989). 
 Figure 2.17 shows the difference between safety as computed using a fixed-
maneuver assumption, and the more realistic safety probability the alerting system would 
predict if it were able to take future decisions into account.  The more accurate 
knowledge would have an impact the alerting decision at tc, possibly causing the alert to 
be deferred longer than it would be otherwise.  This would reduce the unnecessary alert 
probability, assuming the SOC trajectory continued moving leftward. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17: Error in Computed Safety 
Another important observation to make is that if the alerting system has only 
uncertain knowledge of the situation state (a belief state), then taking future decisions 
into account in probability calculations also requires considering future belief states.  
This is because at future points in time the alerting system will have made additional 
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observations of the situation, and as a result it will have gained new information that will 
affect the decision made at that time. 
If it can be done, this kind of probability estimate would enable decision making 
that is more rational and potentially better than others in that, to achieve a specific goal, 
the decision maker uses more of the information available in the alerting process model 
and from observations than in simpler methods.  Methods currently available for solving 
this kind of decision problem are described in Markov decision process (MDP) theory, 
and will be applied later in this thesis.  This is a novel approach to designing hazard 
avoidance alerting systems, because existing probabilistic prediction-based logics tend to 
use the simpler maneuver-based methods. 
An issue that comes up and will be addressed later is that this most general 
method of probabilistic planning has the potential to be more complex numerically, and 
too difficult to carry out in real time with trajectory simulation-based methods like Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
2.4.3 Strategy to Avoid Improper Alerts 
 For the alerting system to be accepted by its users, it should avoid significant 
numbers of nuisance alerts.  Ideally it would avoid all improper alerts, meaning operators 
would agree with its actions in all scenarios (section 2.2).  The design process should 
include a strategy for minimizing such alerts. 
 An alerting system’s improper alert tendencies are usually detected and 
eliminated in a process of trial and error, using simulations or other tests along with 
human judgment.  Because improper alerts are inherently subjective, it is unclear how to 
control them directly through definition of the alerting threshold and avoidance logic.  
Assumptions are sometimes made, at least implicitly, that improper alerts are closely 
related to unnecessary alerts, so that minimizing unnecessary alerts also minimizes 
nuisance alerts.  Assuming this relationship is true, it still does not provide a means of 
avoiding delayed alerts that could also be considered improper. 
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 In this thesis an assumption is made that a more general and complete description 
is needed of what causes improper alerts, and this description should guide the basic 
definition of the alerting threshold.  Part of the motive for a decision theoretic approach 
to alerting is an hypothesis that, by approximating a rational decision process and basing 
it on goals compatible with operator preferences, an alerting logic will tend to avoid 
improper alerts.  This notion will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter described the basic ideas of probabilistic prediction-based alerting as 
it is typically done, and then argued the need for certain improvements in design:  mode 
uncertainty modeling and accounting for future decision opportunities. 
 First the alerting process was described in mathematical terms.  The alerting 
system can be though of as a controller of a situation made up of human operators and a 
plant they interact with.  States of dynamic process elements are expressed as state 
vectors, and the overall situation has a state s.  The dynamics of s are described by a 
probabilistic transition function T(s(tc), τa), which is the conditional distribution of 
possible next states resulting from a given alert signal τa and current state s(tc).  The 
alerting system makes observations of the situation through the probabilistic sensor 
function O(s(tc)), which is the conditional distribution of possible measurements o of the 
current state. 
 The fundamental aspects of alerting system performance were reviewed.  There 
are three types of error that an alerting system can make:  unsuccessful alerts, 
unnecessary alerts and improper alerts.  An unsuccessful alert is one where an alert is 
followed by an incident, either because the alert was too late or because it actually caused 
an incident that would not have happened otherwise (an induced incident).  An 
unnecessary alert is one where the alert is not necessary to prevent an incident, and 
results in an unneeded evasion maneuver or an induced incident.  An improper alert is an 
outcome where a human operator feels an alert is incorrect—either too early or too late—
and can harm operator conformance to alerts over time. 
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 Next, the use of probabilistic state filtering in alerting systems was discussed, 
followed by how probabilistic performance metrics are used to define the alerting 
threshold. 
 Finally, new decision considerations were discussed in relation to current 
methods, with the overall aim of increasing the amount of available information that is 
applied to the decision.  One is the possibility of using belief state filtering to model 
uncertainty of dynamic modes.  Another is the use of information about future decision 
options, including possible future belief states, to make more informed alerting decisions, 
both at the threshold and during the evasion guidance phase.  Finally, a short discussion 
of improper alert reduction as a goal of design was included.  The need was stressed for 
use of an improper alert model early in the design to minimize trial and error improper 
alert reduction later. 
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3. Related Work 
 
 This research concerns methods for designing tactical hazard avoidance alerting 
systems of the kind increasingly used in aviation safety applications.  These systems are 
characterized by their use as backup safety devices for infrequent hazards, numerous 
input state variables, complex alert signals such as staged alerts and dynamically 
generated resolution guidance, and multiple dynamic modes in the monitored situation.  
This thesis will apply methods from Markov decision Process (MDP) theory to such 
systems to guide design and improve performance.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship 
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Figure 3.1: Related Research 
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of this problem to broader existing areas of research.  The following sections give an 
overview of the most closely related work, sharing two or more of the large categories 
and identified in the diagram with shading. 
3.1 Time-Critical Hazard Alerting Systems 
 Existing alerting system designs can be divided roughly into three categories:  
conformance-based, simple trajectory-based and complex trajectory-based. 
 Conformance-based alerting systems operate under the reasoning that abnormal 
system behavior justifies an alert.  An example is the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) 
alerting system for preventing collisions during closely spaced parallel runway 
approaches (Shank, 1994).  In this case alerts are triggered when a radar-tracked aircraft 
crosses into a “no transgression zone” separating two approach paths, as in figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: PRM Conformance-Based Alerting Threshold 
Such an alerting system has no inherent tendency to avoid unnecessary alerts (where no 
incident would occur without the alert).  For example, PRM would trigger an alert even if 
there were no aircraft in the adjacent approach path to be endangered. 
 A more sophisticated type of logic is simple trajectory-based alerting.  In this 
method alerts are triggered through a combination of a rough state prediction model and 
incident proximity criteria.  For example, the TCAS aircraft collision avoidance system 
uses range and time threshold criteria along with an assumption of constant range rate.  In 
such an alerting system there may be several threshold parameters that must be tuned to 
give acceptable performance in terms of unnecessary alerts and safety.   Other examples 
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of this type of alerting in aviation are the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) 
terrain avoidance logic and Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) logic for 
parallel approach collision avoidance. 
 Complex trajectory-based alerting uses a more realistic trajectory model and 
threshold criteria that are stated directly in terms of alerting performance requirements.  
An example is the parallel approach logic by Teo & Tomlin (2003) that triggers alerts 
according to worst-case safety requirements for escape maneuvers.  More common are 
alerting logics that use probabilistic state prediction models and decision metrics.  At 
MIT logics have been developed (Carpenter & Kuchar; Yang & Kuchar, 2002) using 
probabilistic safety and unnecessary alert performance metrics (P(Successful Alert) and 
P(Unnecessary Alert)) to define the alerting threshold. 
 Of these three alerting approaches, the Markov decision process alerting method 
described in this thesis is most similar to complex trajectory-based alerting with 
probabilistic modeling and decision metrics.  This is because it too uses explicit 
probabilistic prediction modeling and probabilistic decision metrics to define the logic.  It 
is distinct, however, in that existing approaches have not made use of probabilistic mode 
uncertainty models or information about possible future decisions.  Alerting logics 
typically involve continuous or observable state variables, and decision metrics are 
computed with an assumption that a fixed control sequence will be followed. 
3.2 Hazard Avoidance with Mode Modeling 
 An overlapping area of research concerns hazard avoidance using uncertain mode 
modeling, which includes more strategic forms of detection and avoidance. 
At MIT recent attention has been given to conformance monitoring as an 
approach to avoiding incidents in an airspace environment (Reynolds & Hansman).  In 
this work a fault detection approach was used to judge whether aircraft were conforming 
or not to an expected path.  As with conformance-based tactical alerting systems such as 
PRM, the driving philosophy in this case is that detection of abnormal system behavior 
justifies intervention.  This point of view is consistent with the current air traffic control 
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system, where aircraft in controlled airspace are monitored continuously for deviations as 
they fly along pre-approved routes. 
The Markov decision process alerting method differs from this in two main ways.  
One is that fault detection results in a conclusion that the system is in a specific mode, 
whereas with the MDP method mode probabilities are maintained and used to weight the 
outcomes predicted for the different possible modes.  Another difference is that in the 
MDP case alerting decisions depend on predicted final outcomes, whereas interventions 
are justified by the mode in a fault detection method. 
There are other mode-based hazard avoidance methods more similar to MDP 
alerting in that they use state prediction and mode probability updating.  An MIT group 
(Yang et al, 2004) has applied mode uncertainty modeling and estimation to automotive 
collision avoidance.  Probabilities are computed in real time for a number of possible 
dynamic models (modes) using a multiple Kalman filter approach.  A mode estimate is 
determined from this and used with a hazard prediction model to choose the alerting 
action.  Another method recently suggested (Hwang et al, 2003) for aircraft conflict 
detection combines mode estimation with a probabilistic trajectory prediction model to 
estimate collision probabilities.  The MDP approach proposed here differs from both of 
these methods in that the mode probability distribution rather than a mode estimate taken 
from the distribution is used in making predictions.  Also, in the MDP approach 
predictions will include information about future decisions yet to be made, whereas both 
of these assume a predetermined control sequence will be followed, as described in 
section 2.4.2. 
3.3 Alerting with Markov Decision Processes 
 Markov decision processes have been applied in various decision aids such as 
navigation advisors that continuously help users optimize their movements.  They have 
also been used for alerting applications. 
One relevant case is an alarm system concept designed at Stanford to assist ICU 
physicians in making optimal use of limited attention resources (Huang, 1999).  
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Successive alerts would direct physicians to patients most urgently needing attention.  
This application involved a fully observable Markov patient model, whereas the proposed 
alerting application allows a partially observable state (uncertain modes).  
Another related use of Markov decision processes is work by Horvitz with others 
on designing MDP-based software agents to help humans accomplish tasks, including 
during time-critical decision situations such as medical emergencies (Horvitz & 
Rutledge, 1991; Horvitz & Seiver, 1997).  One application combined Markov decision 
processes with an uncertain user attention model to optimize the timing of email alerts 
(Horvitz et al, 1999).  This latter research is very similar to the proposed use of MDPs, 
but differs in that the present work concerns time-critical hazard avoidance alerting and 
specific issues for this kind of alerting, including escape guidance, uncertain dynamic 
modes.  In addition this thesis also discusses MDP-based alerting in the context of current 
hazard alerting methods, including specific peformance measures such as P(SA), P(UA) 
and improper alert rates, in order to point out differences and benefits. 
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4. Alerting with Markov Decision Processes 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Richard Bellman introduced Markov decision processes in 1957 as a variant of his 
more general “dynamic programming” theory of optimal control, itself based on work by 
Hamilton and Jacobi in the 1800s (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Bellman 1957a,b).  Dynamic 
programming is a method of controlling dynamic systems to optimize some measure of 
the state trajectory.  A typical problem is controlling a vehicle’s speed to minimize fuel 
use on the way to a destination.  A Markov decision process is such a problem where 
time is discrete and the process dynamics exhibit probabilistic randomness.  Since its 
invention, the theory has been extended to allow probabilistic current-state uncertainty 
due to limited observability.  Such a process is termed a partially observable Markov 
decision process (POMDP). 
 Markov decision processes have been applied in economics, operations research, 
control systems design, and artificial intelligence (AI) among other areas.  In AI research, 
MDP theory has gained favor as a model of rational decision making in well-defined 
circumstances where an intelligent agent’s outcome preferences can be expressed as a 
trajectory utility function (Russel & Norvig).  This point of view is supported by the 
success of MDP-based systems in complex reasoning tasks such as playing master-level 
backgammon against humans (Tesauro, 1994).  As demonstrated in that work, MDPs can 
sometimes be combined with reinforcement learning techniques to avoid the need to 
directly define utility and reward functions.  Russell and Norvig (2003) give a good 
introduction to MDPs from an AI point of view, and are the main resource for MDP 
theory and terminology in this chapter.  Other popular references include Bertsekas 
(1987, 1995) and Puterman (1994).  
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 The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of MDP theory in an alerting 
systems context.  Most of the needed components—the Markov state, probabilistic 
dynamics and sensor functions—were introduced in chapter 2. 
4.2 Problem Formulation 
 MDP theory requires the alerting process to be modeled in discrete time.  Time is 
represented as a series of integers, k, where each k corresponds to a point in time, tk.  
Hazard alerting processes are often discrete anyway, due to the nature of the hardware 
implementation, which can involve digital computers and sensors with limited update 
rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Markov Alerting Process 
4.2.1 MDP Alerting Model 
Figure 4.1 shows the Markov alerting process model and necessary components. 
A basic process includes: 
s, S Markov situation state and state space  
a, A Alerting actions and action space  
sk+1 = T( sk, a ) Probabilistic transition function describing the 
distribution of next states within S due to a given 
action from at the current state 
(4.1) 
 
Alerting System 
 
 
 
O(⋅) 
 
a(k) 
o(k) 
T(⋅, ⋅) 
Situation 
s(k) 
Uτ(⋅) 
S, O, A 
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Uτ( sk, sk+1, … sn ) Trajectory utility function defining the total utility 
of a state trajectory τ, where n can be infinitely 
large 
(4.2) 
The notation “sk” is short for s(k).  In a standard MDP as defined above, the state is 
assumed to be fully observable.  A more general version of the problem, called a partially 
observable Markov decision process or POMDP, allows for an uncertain observation or 
sensor function: 
o, O Set of possible observations of the state  
ok = O( sk ) Probabilistic observation sensor function describing the 
distribution of observations within O for a given state. 
(4.3) 
 In a sense any alerting problem is partially observable, since the sensors needed to 
measure the state are imperfect, but in some cases a regular MDP model may be an 
appropriate approximation.  Systems with unobservable mode variables in the state will 
likely need a POMDP model. 
4.2.2 Trajectory Utility Function 
In MDP theory the long-term priorities of the decision maker, in this case the 
alerting system, are described by a trajectory utility function, Uτ( sk, sk+1, … sn ).  This 
function is a mapping of each possible system trajectory into scalar value, where the 
larger the value, the more desirable the trajectory is.  For any two outcomes (trajectories), 
the one with the larger utility is preferred.  In sequential decision making, each successive 
action is chosen to maximize the overall utility of the trajectory, including the future 
trajectory. 
This definition of the utility function is a very general one, and to simplify the 
problem an assumption can be made that the utility function is stationary:  that it (and the 
preferences it represents) stays constant with time.  A consequence of the assumption is 
that the utility function takes the form of a sum of rewards: 
Uτ(sk, sk+1, … sn) = R(sk) + γ R(sk+1) + γ2 R(sk+2) + . . . = Σ γt-k R(st) (4.4) t = k 
n 
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Here the R factors are rewards gained at each new state, and γ is a discounting factor 
between 0 and 1 that reduces the reward of future states progressively with projection 
time.  The discounting factor is included because in the case of n = ∞ (an infinite 
horizon) a sum of non-discounted trajectory utilities could be infinite, in which case it 
would be impossible to rank trajectories by utility as needed.  In some cases a discounted 
reward function may also better represent the priorities of the alerting system. 
 For the case of γ = 1 the rewards are additive with no discounting.  This is 
allowable if the process has a finite time horizon.  A finite horizon can be a reasonable 
assumption where the potential for incidents exists over identifiable time intervals, such 
as the time between when an alerting system begins tracking an intruder vehicle and 
when it has safely passed. 
 The R function, or reward function, can be though of as the most fundamental 
expression of decision preferences, with Uτ being just a function of R.  R is a constant 
function that assigns an immediate reward to every possible state.  To use the Markov 
framework it will be necessary to describe the requirements of the alerting system in this 
form, and this may partially dictate the choice of state variables.  Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
reward accumulation process for a 3-state discrete-time system, assuming no reward 
discounting.  Each time an action is taken, causing a transition to the next state, a reward 
is gained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Reward Accumulation 
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4.3 Expected Utility-Based Decisions 
4.3.1 Maximum Expected Utility Principle 
 For a system with deterministic dynamics and a known state—where the exact 
trajectory and utility can be predicted for a sequence of actions—the preferred action at 
any time is the one that would lead to the highest overall utility.  Specifically, for the 
trajectory utility function defined in section 4.2, the best action is the first action of the 
sequence that maximizes the utility function.  These ideal conditions often fail to hold in 
realistic system models:  current-state uncertainty, imperfect observability, and dynamic 
uncertainty can make an exact utility prediction impossible.  Instead, the utility of a given 
action sequence becomes a random variable with a distribution of possible values, 
making it impossible to say which next action maximizes utility. 
In MDP theory, and decision theory in general, the maximum expected utility 
principle is used for decisions under uncertainty.  It states that the preferred action is the 
one producing the greatest expected (mean) outcome utility, rather than the best exact 
utility: 
ak:      max E[ U(sk+1) ] (4.5) 
Where ak is the preferred kth action and U(sk+1) is the maximum expected utility possible 
at the next state, sk+1. 
4.3.2 Expected Utility of States 
 With utility defined by expression 4.4, the action taken at each step should be the 
one that maximizes the expected utility of the entire state trajectory.  By the principle of 
optimality, this also means that the action should maximize the expected utility of the 
remaining future trajectory.  Each state, then, can be thought of as having an associated 
maximum expected utility4, U(s).  That utility is given by the Bellman equation 
                                                 
4
 The maximum expected utility of a state is sometimes referred to as the “utility” of the state for 
convenience. 
ak 
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U(sk) = R(sk) + γ max E[ U(sk+1) ] (4.6) 
This says that the utility of the current state sk is the reward that was gained at sk plus the 
discounted maximum expected utility of the following state, sk+1.  Since (4.6) also 
determines U(sk+1) from its following states, U(sk) could be calculated by recursively 
applying (4.6) into the future, if not for the computational difficulties of doing so. 
 Computing the expected utility of an action in such a way is a difficult task.  
Finding the expected utility of a given action requires knowing the maximum expected 
utility of each possible next state (at worst the entire state space) over all possible actions, 
so in the worst case the number of utility calculations (and amount of computing time) 
increases in proportion to nm q(m-1), where n is the number of possible states, q is the 
number of available actions, and m is the number of action stages considered.5  The 
increase in computations with the number of action stages is illustrated in figure 4.3 for 
the 3-state system of figure 4.2, where m reaches 3.  The number of possible state paths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Computing Expected Action Utility 
increases according to nm.  A single state path in the figure can correspond to more than 
one sequence of actions, which further expands the number of possible distinct 
cumulative reward scenarios.  At this rate, going beyond a few time steps into the future 
can quickly become too time and memory consuming to be feasible. 
                                                 
5
 Using a limited number of steps into the future to compute expected utility presumes there is knowledge 
or an acceptable approximation of the utility of the future-most states.   
s(k) s(k+1) s(k+2) s(k+3) 
nm = 31 
      = 3 possible paths 
32 = 9 possible paths 
33 = 27 possible paths 
s1 
s2 
s3 
ak 
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 The mentioned number of possible utility scenarios is for the worst case, while in 
reality simplifying assumptions are often reasonable.  For example, prior constraints on 
the form of action sequences can reduce the number of possibilities.  In addition, state 
transitions from a given initial state are typically limited to a small part of the state space 
by nature of the dynamics. 
 Another way to limit computational complexity is to use approximation methods, 
such as cutting off expected utility computations at a manageable number of steps and 
using a heuristic approximation of maximum expected utility at that stage. 
 The complexity of computing utilities through recursive simulation is significant 
because it can rule out numerical methods, such as Monte Carlo simulation, that are 
possible with other alerting philosophies (Yang & Kuchar, 2002). 
4.4 Policy Solutions 
 In general, any function that maps each state in S into a unique action is called a 
policy and referenced by the pi symbol: 
a = pi(s) (4.7) 
The decision rule described in the previous section, based on maximizing expected 
utility, does this and also ensures a utility-optimal action.  An optimal policy is 
distinguished with an asterisk 
a* = pi*(s) (4.8) 
The optimal decision rule from section 4.3 would likely be too slow or inaccurate if 
recursively simulated as described, and a better form would be desirable—for example, 
this could be a table where pre-computed values can be quickly looked up at each state, 
or a parameterized function with parameters computed offline. 
 One efficient policy generation method for the optimal policy is value iteration.  
It follows from the fact that the maximum expected utility at each state, U(s), is related 
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to that of its neighboring states by the Bellman equation (4.6).  If there are n states in S, 
then there are n Bellman equations U(⋅) must simultaneously satisfy.  Due to the 
nonlinearity of the Bellman equation there is no guaranteed analytical solution, but 
iterative numerical methods often work.  Starting with an arbitrary function U(⋅), the 
Bellman equation is applied at every state in S to generate an updated utility function.  
This is repeated until convergence of the utility function is achieved.  Now, since all of 
the next-state utilities are all known for any initial state, the policy can be found by 
applying the maximum expected utility rule (4.5) with a 1-step look-ahead at each state. 
 Another efficient iterative method is policy iteration.  Starting with some arbitrary 
policy pi, a utility function U(⋅) is generated by applying Bellman’s equation at each state 
in a manner similar to value iteration.  Then an updated policy is generated using the 
maximum expected utility rule with U(⋅).  These two steps are repeated until the utility 
function stops changing. 
 Both of these common policy generation methods are more efficient than the 
recursive method described previously, with required memory proportional to n and 
computation time increasing with n2 q c, where n is the size of S, q is the number of 
actions, and c is the number of iterations.  This is relatively manageable compared to the 
exponentially increasing resource requirements for forward simulation utility estimation 
for a single state. 
A serious problem remains:  the number of states in S can increase exponentially 
with the number of state variables in the vector s.  At worst, the total number of states is 
the product of the domain sizes of all variables.  Because of this, available computing 
power puts a limit on the number state variables that can be used in the logic.  It may be 
possible to solve a large problem if some part of the domain can be discarded as unlikely 
to be occupied of physically impossible. 
In very large or continuous state spaces it may be necessary to use function 
approximation methods to model U(⋅) to reduce the number of parameters that must be 
computed and stored.  For example, neural nets have been used for this purpose 
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(Tesauro), along with training procedures for determining the necessary value function 
parameters. 
4.5 Partially Observable MDP Alerting 
4.5.1 POMDP Solution Issues 
Solution methods described in previous sections have assumed full observability 
so that s is known exactly.  When the state is only partially observable, so that a belief 
state must be used, then any recursive prediction approach to calculating expected utility 
of actions would also involve recursive prediction of future belief states.  Or in other 
words, the decision process requires an awareness of future belief states that could result 
from different actions.  For example, in an alerting problem involving uncertain modes, 
the alerting system may decide to defer an alert in the knowledge that the mode 
uncertainty will be reduced by coming events and observations, allowing greater 
expected safety or a smaller unnecessary alert probability than an immediate alert. 
 The maximum expected utility for the partially observable case is no longer 
described by the Bellman equation (4.6), so previously given policy solution methods do 
not clearly apply.  The standard approach to solving POMDP problems is to view the 
belief state as another state variable with its own state space.  The belief state space 
(belief space) is the set of probability distributions possible over the original state space 
S.  Viewed this way, the POMDP can be thought of as an MDP where the belief state 
space replaces S as the state domain.  Then standard MDP solutions apply. 
 A remaining challenge is that the belief state space must be indexed so that 
solution algorithms can step systematically through the space.  Another is that even if an 
index scheme is found, the number of belief states that must be considered may be too 
large for available methods to be practical, depending on the complexity of possible 
belief distribution functions.  Such POMDP solution issues are an active area of research. 
 The belief space can be thought of as a parameterized function over the domain S, 
where varying the parameters allows the function to represent the entire range of belief 
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states.  Then, individual belief states correspond to particular parameter choices or 
coordinates.  This makes enumeration of the belief states straightforward.  The fewer 
parameters there are, and the more limited their ranges, the fewer belief states will likely 
be needed to adequately cover a continuous belief space.  This hints of the possibility of 
approximating a complicated belief space with a reduced-order model, having fewer 
parameters and needing fewer parameter combinations to span the belief space.  Such 
belief compression methods may prove important to design of future alerting systems 
involving uncertain modes or many state variables. 
4.5.2 Belief State Filtering 
 As described in chapter 2, the combination of probabilistic uncertain dynamics 
and probabilistic observability leads to uncertainty in the current state in the form of a 
probability distribution (belief state).  The belief state takes into account all available 
information, including prior knowledge, the transition and sensor models, observations 
made and past inputs to the system.  This combining of information is achieved at each 
time step using a recursive algorithm: 
bs(k)  =  α  O( s(k) )      T( s(k-1), a(k-1) )  bs(k-1)  (4.9) 
 The formula states that the updated belief state, bs(k), is found by summing the 
transition functions for all possible current s(k-1), weighting at each state by the current 
state likelihood bs(k-1), and then multiplying the resulting function of s(k) times the 
observation function, O( o(k) | s(k) ).  The constant α ensures that the resulting 
distribution function sums to 1 over its domain.  Since the values of a(k-1) and o(k) are 
assumed known, and s(k-1) is eliminated by the summation, the final expression is a 
function of s(k) only.  Note that the previous belief state can be either the result of a 
previous iteration of the formula or a prior belief state, bs(0), that initializes the process.  
Thus, this formula does incorporate all of the information available in prior knowledge, 
bs(0), the process model, T(⋅,⋅) and O(⋅), and the history of past actions and observations 
(the evidence), { o(0), a(0), o(1), a(1), …, o(k), a(k) }. 
All s(k-1) 
Σ
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 The Markov assumption that was made in defining T(⋅,⋅) is important here 
because it allows the recursive formula shown, as opposed to one that explicitly contains 
the entire evidence history.  Given that the amount of evidence increases with time, such 
an expression would become increasingly unwieldy and impractical to use with time.  For 
a more detailed discussion of the belief filtering formula and the significance of the 
Markov assumption, see appendix A. 
4.6 Human Modeling Issues 
 As mentioned in section 4.2.2, the reward function R(⋅) over the state space S is 
meant as an approximate representation of the goals or priorities of the alerting system.  
Based on this, the MDP theory generates a policy that is optimal in the utility 
maximization sense, and presumably rational.  The human operators that receive alerts 
might also be assumed rational, at least ideally, and to act to maximize their own utility 
function.  Such an operator would try to make best use of any signals generated by the 
alerting system and to do so requires a notion of what the alerting signal means.  This is 
only to point out that whatever R(⋅) is used for the alerting system involves at least 
implicit assumptions about operator behavior and preferences.  If the reward function 
conflicts in some way with an operator’s understanding of the alerts, or sense of what is 
justified, the result is improper alerts (section 2.2).  This means that when using the MDP 
design method, which maps alerting preferences directly into the logic, the potential for 
improper alerts should be considered at the reward function definition stage. 
 A related issue is the fact that operators learn from observations of the alerting 
system’s behavior, which can cause their understanding of and reactions to alerts to 
change over time.  For this reason it may still be necessary to perform the sort of global 
trajectory analysis that is commonly used in current methods.  For example, Monte Carlo 
analysis of the alerting logic can provide a more complete picture of the human responses 
implied by the reward function and operator model that were used, including rates at 
which evasion commands are modified or reversed, and the overall rates of alerts and 
incidents.  This will help in judging whether the situation model seems consistent with 
realistic operator behavior.  A high alert or incident rate in simulations where an operator 
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is assumed to conform to alerts could indicate an inherently unacceptable situation where 
no alerting system would help.  In the end, the alerting system design process may take 
an iterative form where reward and utility functions are arrived at through adjustment of 
initial estimates. 
4.7 Chapter Summary 
 The alerting problem is restated in terms of the basic elements of a Markov 
decision process.  This includes the state space { s, S },  the observation space { o, O }, 
the action space { a, A }, the transition function T(s, τa), and the observation function 
O(s) (for partially observable problems, such as with uncertain modes). 
 The method also requires defining alerting system performance requirements 
(outcome preferences) in terms of a trajectory utility function Uτ(τ), which associates a 
utility value with every possible trajectory τ.  The utility function is so defined that for 
any two outcome trajectories, the relative utilities describe the degree of alerting system 
preference between the two.  The trajectory utility function corresponds to a reward 
function R(s) that gives the reward (utility contribution) of the situation reaching a 
particular state.  The utility of a trajectory is the cumulative reward from the sequence of 
states passed through. 
 Decisions are made by the maximum expected utility principle.  Ideally, the 
decision that would result in the maximum utility is preferred, but state uncertainty (due 
to the stochastic transition and sensor functions) makes exact utility impossible to 
compute.  Expected utility is considered the next best decision metric. 
 Expected utility can be difficult or impossible to estimate quickly through forward 
simulation of trajectories.  Because alerting decisions must occur in real time, a more 
efficient means of estimating expected utilities is needed.  This is achieved through 
policy generation, in which a function relating each state, or belief state, to an expected 
utility and optimal action is pre-computed using Bellman’s equation.  The policy is stored 
in a table or other form that allows real-time retrieval of function values. 
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 Alerting processes involving uncertain mode variables have more complicated 
policy solutions, because the policy is then a function of a belief state rather than a 
regular state (making it a POMDP problem).  One common solution method involves 
representing the belief state as a parameterized function, so that the range of possible 
belief states corresponds to a range of parameter values.  Then the problem can be 
approached in the same way as a regular MDP. 
 The reward function of an alerting system represents the alerting system’s 
preferences, which in turn should be related to and in agreement with the preferences of 
operators who receive alerts.  Otherwise, the alerting system will produce improper alerts 
that harm long-term performance. 
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5. Applying the MDP Method to an Aircraft 
Passing Scenario 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter the benefit of MDP methods is shown for a simplified aircraft 
collision avoidance problem.  Figure 5.1 shows the scenario of interest.  Two aircraft 
approach one another at similar altitudes so that there is some nominal probability of a 
collision.  A collision will be defined as the crossing of one aircraft through a protected 
region about the other, as shown.  One aircraft, called the evader, has the option of using 
a climb evasion maneuver if needed to avoid a collision with the other aircraft, or 
intruder.  Each aircraft moves randomly in altitude over time, and this translates into a 
randomly changing vertical separation between the two.  This randomness makes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Aircraft Encounter Scenario 
exact forecasting of a collision impossible, so it is not clear if or when an evasion 
maneuver is needed.  This is a basic example compared to many realistic alerting 
situations (e.g., where additional avoidance options or 3-dimensional position might be 
involved), but the simplifications cause no loss of generality in the methods described, 
and could be relaxed. 
Avoidance maneuver 
Intruder 
Evader 
Collision region 
Nominal direction 
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 Figure 5.2 shows a model of the 2-aircraft system.  The aircraft are constrained to 
a plane, with the evader fixed at the origin of the relative position axes, x and y.  The 
relative horizontal speed is assumed constant, while the relative vertical speed can vary in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Markov Encounter Model – Nominal Dynamics 
either direction over time.  Prior to any alert, the relative motion is described by a process 
of the form 
x(k+1) = x(k) + vclosing ∆t 
y(k+1) = y(k) + vw(k) ∆t 
(5.1) 
with the following definitions 
  x(k+1)  Horizontal relative position at the next time step 
y(k+1)  Vertical relative position at the next time step 
x(k)   Current horizontal relative position 
y(k)   Current vertical relative position 
∆t   Constant time increment 
vclosing  Constant horizontal closing rate 
Intruder 
Evader 
x 
y 
vclosing ∆t 
x(k) x(k+1) 
Gaussian uncertainty 
Collision region 
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vw(k)  Gaussian white sequence climb rate disturbance input 
The first equation describes the constant horizontal closing rate as a discrete-time 
process.  The second says that the future vertical position of the intruder is a discrete-time 
Markov random process depending only on relative altitude.  Vertical position is 
predictable only within a normal distribution whose mean is the current position.  The 
variance of predicted vertical position increases linearly with the number of steps into the 
future (Brown & Hwang). 
 While the previous equations describe the nominal dynamics that apply before 
any evasion maneuver occurs, the following one describes the vertical position during a 
climb escape maneuver (figure 5.3): 
y(k+1) = y(k) + ( vw(k) + vclimb ) ∆t (5.2) 
The difference is the addition of a constant bias, vclimb, the average climb rate.  The 
horizontal motion is identical for the nominal and evasion cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Markov Encounter Model – Climb Dynamics 
A climb by the evader causes a relative descent by the intruder, as figure 5.3 shows. 
Intruder 
Evader 
x 
y 
vclosing ∆t 
 
x(k) x(k+1) 
Gaussian climb uncertainty 
Climb bias 
vclimb ∆t 
Gaussian nominal uncertainty 
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Since the evader is fixed at the origin, a collision happens if the intruder crosses 
through a region about the origin.  Because vertical motion is slow relative to horizontal, 
the collision region is simplified for convenience from an area around the evader to 
passing within 100 vertical feet at the y-axis, as shown in the figures with a hatched bar. 
To simplify the discussion, this model has only two physical state variables:  the 
relative vertical and horizontal positions.  A more realistic description of aircraft 
dynamics could use additional state variables, such as the absolute speeds and positions 
of each aircraft, but the same design principles would apply.  The next chapter will 
consider one possible improvement, namely the inclusion of a dynamic mode variable to 
distinguish between normal and failure situations. 
 Parameters were chosen to simulate an aircraft encounter with a horizontal 
closing speed of vclosing = 440 knots (743 ft/sec).  An input noise standard deviation of vw 
= 1,858 ft/min (31 ft/sec) was assumed with a 0.32 sec time increment ∆t.  This is 
equivalent to a vertical drift standard deviation of 100 ft after a 24,000 ft (approximately 
4 nautical mile) horizontal interval.  The simplified model produces random trajectories 
that tend to remain near the initial relative altitude, with possible moderate climbing or 
descending.  A mean evasion climb rate vclimb of 1,500 ft/min (25 ft/sec) is assumed. 
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 Figure 5.4 shows an example trajectory resulting from these dynamic assumptions 
over a 32 second interval.  For the first (right) half the nominal dynamics are used, and 
for the second half the climb dynamics are used.  The collision region is also included as 
a shaded bar about the evader. 
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Figure 5.4: Example Trajectory:  Nominal and Climb Dynamics 
5.2 Basic Reward Function for Alerting 
 The MDP framework requires that all of the goals or preferences of the alerting 
system be represented in terms of the relative utilities of events that can happen.  Then 
the decision process becomes a matter of acting to maximize expected utility at each step. 
 In SOC (system operating characteristic) analysis the quality of alerting decisions 
is measured in terms of whether alerts happen, whether they are needed, and whether the 
resulting trajectories are safe.  There are desirable and undesirable final outcomes, and as 
discussed in section 2.2, it is typically impossible to guarantee that only desirable ones 
happen.  A trade-off must be made between them.  SOC plots are one tool for analyzing 
the trade-off, stating it in terms of the probabilities or rates of positive and negative 
outcomes. 
Making a trade-off between different outcomes requires knowing the relative 
desirability of the outcomes.  In a utility approach such preferences are expressed by 
 72 
assigning numeric values to the outcomes.  Outcomes with larger numbers have greater 
desirability, and the larger the difference between two possibilities, the greater the 
preference of one over the other.  In figure 5.5 possible alerting outcomes are divided into 
a set of mutually exclusive events.  These are all of the possible combinations of the three 
above-mentioned categories from SOC theory, six in all (the two shaded event blocks are 
excluded because they are impossible.)  Recall that an alert is considered successful if no 
incident happens, and necessary if an incident would have happened without the alert. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Utilities of Alerting Outcomes 
 In a Markov decision process approach to the alerting problem this information 
about outcome preferences must be expressed as a trajectory utility function, which will 
be assumed to take the form 
Uτ = ∑ Rt (5.3) 
where the total utility for the future trajectory is a sum of the rewards gained at each state. 
This is the additive rewards utility function (eq. 4.4) described in section 4.2, where the 
discounting factor is set to 1.  This is reasonable here assuming rewards are well bounded 
and that the alerting process ends at some point in time so that the trajectory utility is 
finite.  A convenient end point for the aircraft passing situation is when the intruder 
passes the y axis:  after this point the intruder no longer poses a danger, so the alerting 
system can stop monitoring it. 
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A utility ranking of the outcomes could be defined as follows 
Uincident ≡ ULA = UII  = UMD 
USA ≡ UCD = UUA 
Uincident < USA < UCR 
(5.4) 
This says that all collision outcomes have equal utility, all successful alert outcomes have 
equal utility, and correct rejections are preferred over all other outcomes.  In some ways 
this ranking may seem oversimplified; a correct detection seems intuitively better than an 
unnecessary alert, and an induced collision might be considered worse than a missed 
detection or late alert.  On the other hand, once an alert occurs it is impossible to know 
whether it was necessary or not in order to make such utility distinctions, because the 
alert precludes observing the nominal trajectory.  So whether there is any practical 
difference between the different kinds of incident is debatable.  Examples in this thesis 
will assume the (5.4) outcome utility scheme, but it should be noted that the generality of 
utility does allow for other schemes if needed. 
In its favor, this utility scheme conforms to with existing SOC philosophy in that 
there are two main error types—incidents (unsuccessful alerts) and unnecessary alerts—
that should both be avoided if possible to maximize utility.  Otherwise some optimal 
trade-off between the two is needed.  This agreement with SOC philosophy allows a 
direct performance comparison between MDP-based and SOC-based logics in the next 
chapter. 
Specific utility values for the three outcome categories are chosen to best reflect 
the degree of preference between them.  For example, the utility of a successful alert is 
probably much nearer to that of a correct rejection outcome than a collision.  Assuming 
Uincident is fixed, the nearer USA becomes to UCR, the less the alerting system would 
expect to gain from deferring alerts, and the earlier alerts would tend to occur.  This is 
true regardless of the utility of a collision, as long as it is less than the other two.  Thus, 
relative utility can be of more significance than absolute utility when assigning utilities. 
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 Recalling that the trajectory utility is a sum of the rewards for each state passed 
through, one possible reward function is shown in figure 5.6.  If the intruder arrives at a 
point within the collision zone about the evader, then an incident happens and the 
incident utility, Uincident, applies.  Setting the end-state reward value equal to the total 
trajectory utility constrains the previous terms of the reward function in that their values 
must sum to zero.  For collision cases, the most obvious solution is to let all previous 
state rewards be zero.  However, there still two kinds of non-collision outcome to 
consider. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: End-State Reward Definitions 
 While there is no ambiguity about the appropriate collision outcome utility—it 
applies regardless of the previous trajectory taken—the non-collision utility depends on 
whether or not an alert occurred before the end.  An alert happens the first time the climb 
action is selected.  If there was no alert and the trajectory ended in the safe range then 
UCR is the appropriate outcome utility.  If an alert did occur, then the USA utility applies 
instead.  This conditionality on the alert status suggests that lumping the trajectory utility 
into a single end-state reward as in collision would require a third state variable in 
addition to x and y.  This will be designated AS (alert status), and is a discrete two-state 
variable indicating a state either Before or After an alert. 
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 Figure 5.7 illustrates the 3-variable state space and end rewards.  It can be thought 
of as two position planes, one for each alert status, with different end-position rewards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: State Space with Alert Status Variable 
The system trajectory originates in the front plane at the right edge, and moves leftward 
according to the nominal dynamics as long as no alert occurs.  If no alert ever occurs, the 
trajectory will encounter either the incident or the correct rejection end-state utility.  If an 
alert does occur, the state transitions from the Before to the After alert status plane, and 
remains there for the remainder of the scenario.  In that case, non-collision end positions 
have the successful alert rather than the correct rejection reward.  For any trajectory, this 
arrangement assigns the correct outcome utility as defined by the (5.4) expressions.  
Thus, no additional rewards or penalties are needed from trajectory states before the end 
state, and this results in a reward function of the form 
Uτ = R(xf, yf, ASf) (5.5) 
5.3 Alerting Policy and Threshold 
 As mentioned in chapter 4, the most desirable solution to the alerting problem is a 
policy function that determines the next action from the current state with a minimum of 
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computation.  This section describes the policy generation process for the example 
alerting problem, based on the reward function defined in the previous section. 
 This problem is convenient in having a well-defined process end condition—
reaching the y position axis.  It also has dynamics that guarantee an orderly traversal of 
the state space, with no chance of occupying a single state twice (the horizontal position 
always moves forward, and in the same direction.)  This allows generating a policy in a 
direct and fast way that avoids the iterative methods often necessary with MDP problems.  
An inconvenience of this system is that it has a variable with a continuous domain (y) 
whereas the MDP method assumes discrete states.  This is dealt with by using a discrete 
approximation of y. 
 The approach is to generate a function that gives an expected utility for each 
possible action at each state.  Then, by the maximum expected utility principle, the 
preferred action is the one with the highest expected utility.  In this case the utility 
function has a 4-variable domain, including three state variables in figure 5.7 and the 
action. 
First note that for any end state, the expected utility is the exact utility given by 
the reward function defined previously (5.5).  Next, note that the state one step prior to 
that one is in the set of states where xp = xf – ∆x, where xf is the location of the end state 
and ∆x is the increment between horizontal positions.  Knowing the probabilistic system 
dynamics T and the end-state expected utilities U(xf, yf, ASf), the expected utility of the 
prior state, sp = { xp, yp, ASp }, for a particular action a is given by  
           Ua(xp, yp, ASp) =   E( U(xf, yf, ASf) | xp, yp, ASp, a ) 
=   ∑ U(xf, yf, ASf) T(xf, yf, ASf | xp, yp, ASp, a)    
=   ∑ U(sf) T(sf | sp, a)    
(5.6) 
 
All sf 
All sf 
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Figure 5.8 illustrates the variables and functions involved.  From the definition of 
the expected value, Ua(xp, yp, ASp) is the summation of the end-state utility function  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Utility and Probability Distribution of Last Step 
U(xf, yf, ASf), weighted by the final-state distribution (transition function) 
T(xf, yf, ASf | xp, yp, ASp, a), over all possible end states, sf.  In the figure, the black line 
at each xf state represents the probability of transitioning to that state, and the hatched 
bars represent the expected utility of the state.  The two quantities are multiplied at each 
state and then summed to give the expected utility at sp.  In this case xf and ASf are 
determined exactly by the previous state and a, so the transition function is really a 
distribution over yf.  The above formula (5.6) gives the utility for a single action, so the 
calculation must be repeated for each action.  The overall utility of the prior state is 
defined as the maximum value for the possible actions 
U(xp, yp, ASp) = max[ Ua(xp, yp, ASp) ] (5.7) 
and the maximizing action is the policy output for that state.  Notice that what is referred 
to as the “utility” of a state is really the maximum expected utility for that state, but the 
simpler term is sometimes used for convenience. 
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 Using the above formulas (5.7), the utility can be determined for every state in the 
xp subset.  The resulting utility function then becomes the basis for finding utilities for 
the next layer back, x = xp – ∆x, by a similar procedure as with (5.6 and 6.7).  This is 
repeated for every step backward until a complete utility function and action policy is 
obtained for the entire state space. 
 Figure 5.9 shows the pre-alert utility function for each action, resulting from 
applying the described method to the example system with the defined reward function 
(5.5) and outcome utilities of UCR = 1.1, USA = 1 and Uincident = 0.  Each plot is of the 
utility of taking the indicated action at all positions in the plane.  The utility functions are 
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Figure 5.9: Constant-Utility Contours Before Alert 
represented by constant-utility contours.  In each plot, the utility function minimum is 
Uincident and occurs at the x-y origin, and increases outward from there.  In the deferral or 
nominal action case (top) the maximum utility is UCR and occurs in the broad, level area 
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outside the outermost contour.  In the other case the maximum is USA and is also in the 
outermost area. 
 Figure 5.10 shows the complete utility function, covering both before and after-
alert states.  The before-alert plots to the left are the ones from figure 5.9.  After the alert, 
the nominal and climb actions are still both available, but unlike before the alert there is 
no possibility of gaining a UCR reward at the end.  Maximizing utility now means 
maximizing safety, since safe alert outcomes are still worth more than collisions.  The 
after-alert utility functions for the nominal and climb actions are very similar.  The reason 
is that regardless of which action is taken at a given state, both actions are known to be 
available at the next step, and since the position increment is small, not much safety is 
lost due to lost time in a single step. 
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Figure 5.10: Constant-Utility Contours Before and After Alert 
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 The utility functions for the climb action before and after the alert are identical, 
because the distribution of the next state is the same for both. 
If the state begins at s = { x = 24,000 ft, y = 0 ft, AS = Before } and moves 
leftward on a collision course, and assuming alerts are suppressed (so no AS transition 
occurs), a distinct utility trace results for each possible action.  These are as shown 
superimposed in the figure 5.11 plot of utility vs. horizontal distance.  Far from the 
collision there is a slight utility benefit for the nominal action over the climb, hardly 
visible on the plot.  This relative benefit becomes progressively smaller with distance 
until the nominal and climb actions have the same utility where arrow indicates, at 11,000 
ft separation.  Beyond this point the nominal action has a lower utility, and both utilities 
keep decreasing as long as the collision path is followed, due to the decreasing 
probability of avoiding the collision. 
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Figure 5.11: Utility vs. Distance for Head-On Collision Trajectory 
Following the maximum expected utility principle, an evasion maneuver would 
have occurred at the crossover point.  The location of the crossover depends on the 
relative values of the basic outcome utilities:  UCR, USA and Uincident.  If UCR becomes 
greater relative to USA while holding USA - Uincident constant, then the crossover point will 
be delayed longer, because it is more worth risking a collision to avoid alerting. 
The reason the expected utility benefit of the deferral action is so small initially is 
that with the defined system dynamics and initial position, the probability of avoiding a 
collision through normal random drift is small.  If the initial vertical position were further 
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from zero, or the variance of the random process were increased, the utility of the 
nominal action would be nearer to its maximum of 1.1. 
Since the alert threshold is where the two before-alert action options have equal 
utility, the position-plane threshold is the zero-value contour of their difference, defined 
by 
Unominal(x, y, Before) - Uclimb(x, y, Before) = 0. (5.8) 
The two functions Unominal and Uclimb are the ones from figure 5.9.  Figure 5.12 
shows the threshold contour, along with the collision trajectory that produced figure 5.11.  
This is the threshold policy. 
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Figure 5.12: Alerting Threshold (Equal-Action-Utility Contour) 
The intruder begins at the right edge of the plane and moves at constant speed.  
According to the assumed dynamics, the vertical position should change randomly, but an 
idealized trajectory is used to more clearly show the utility trend in figure 5.11.  As long 
as the intruder is outside the threshold contour, the deferral action is preferred.  At the 
threshold, the climb action should be chosen, causing the alert status AS to switch to the 
After value. 
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5.4 After-Alert Guidance 
 During the deferral phase of an encounter, the assumption is that humans in the 
situation are in control and the alerting system is only passively monitoring.  The first use 
of the climb action marks the initial alert displayed to the operators.  At this point the 
situation enters the AS = After state as mentioned.  In this state the alerting system still 
considers both the nominal and climb options, by assumption, but they have different 
meaning in that the alerting system is now actively guiding the situation.  The nominal 
action is then not a deferral of action, but a command to take a non-climb action.  But 
there is no general requirement that post-alert guidance commands correspond one-to-one 
to pre-alert options as in this example. 
 In the same way as the Before alert mode, guidance (After) mode action switching 
occurs along a zero-utility-difference contour in the position plane.  Now this contour is 
formed using the two right-side utility functions from figure 5.10.  The contour is shown 
in figure 5.13, along with the original alerting threshold, which no longer applies.  Also 
drawn is the idealized head-on collision scenario, but where alerts are no longer 
suppressed. 
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Figure 5.13: Guidance Switching Threshold 
When the trajectory reaches the alerting threshold at x = 11,000 ft, a climb action 
is chosen, the alert status switches to After, and the threshold contour is replaced with the 
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guidance switching contour.  Just after the alert, the position is in a region where the 
climb action has the highest utility, and a continuous climb occurs until the new contour 
is reached.  At the lower contour edge and beyond, the climb and nominal utilities are 
equal, at least within the precision of the computed utility functions.  The nominal action 
was chosen as the default for such a condition, so the final trajectory segment past 
x = 2500 ft is a sequence of nominal actions.  In contrast, at the upper contour edge (the 
straight line extending from the origin) the switch is critical, because above this the 
nominal action becomes relatively safe (the utility is higher) compared to the climb. 
 Figure 5.14 shows an example of command switching at the upper contour.  In 
this case a crossing of the alert threshold occurs, but rather than climbing as directed the 
vehicle continues on a level path.  The suggested action continues to be a climb until the 
contour crossing at the 9,000 ft point.  Figure 5.15 shows the action utility traces 
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Figure 5.14: Alert Guidance Reversal Case 
corresponding to the trajectories in figure 5.13 and 5.14.  The vertical dotted lines mark 
the action switch points.  In the normal evasion example, the utility at the alert point is 
nearly 1 (figure 5.15a), which reflects that there is little chance of a collision (in which 
case Uτ = Uincident = 0) to reduce expected utility below the USA level (Uτ = USA = 1).  
All through the evasion maneuver, expected safety and utility of both actions remains 
near 1.  For the figure 5.14 trajectory, where the climb fails to occur when it should, the 
initial utility of the nominal action (5.15b) is larger than in (5.15a) due to the 150 ft 
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vertical offset of the initial position.  Nearer to the evader the deferral utility drops due to 
the decreasing safety of the climb evasion option.  After the alert, the utility of both 
actions declines until the 9000 ft point, where the nominal action is once again safer and 
a command switch occurs.  After this, the nominal action continues to be the safer of the 
two until the end. 
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Figure 5.15: Utilities for Guidance Switching Trajectories 
 Discussing this example has involved statements conflating equating with utility 
during the after-alert phase.  While valid here, it is a special case.  In general, safety and 
utility have a more complicated relationship.  For example, in Before alert states, a 
nominal action utility of 1 could result from averaging more than one combination of 
prior incident (Uτ = 0) and correct rejection (Uτ = 1.1) and successful alert (Uτ = 1) 
probabilities.  After the alert the only two utility outcomes are 0 and 1, so collision 
probability and utility are equivalent. 
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5.5 Cumulative Rewards:  Excessive Guidance Switching 
 The reward function defined in section 5.2 works as hoped for the idealized 
trajectories considered up to now, using only an end-state reward.  A more thorough 
analysis with realistic sample trajectories reveals a problem that figure 5.16 illustrates.  
The original policy results in a guidance switching contour that is fixed for the duration 
of the encounter.  This means that under some conditions, it may be possible for to the 
state to cross the threshold in one direction and quickly return, causing rapid switching.  
This is the case in figure 5.16, where randomness in the vertical position path causes the 
position to waver at the threshold, resulting in 5 switches over several seconds. 
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Figure 5.16: Excessive Guidance Switching 
 Human operators can be expected to follow guidance, but only within limits.  Due 
to unavoidable response delays, rapid command switching may be impossible to follow 
accurately.  In addition such commands can seem irrational or confusing, and cause an 
unpredictable response. 
 One way to deal with this is to build operator limitations like response time into 
the transition function, adding state variables if needed.  An example is adding a timer 
state variable for keeping track of response delays.  Another way is to define the reward 
function with operator preferences in mind, so that alerting system preferences are in 
agreement with operator preferences.  For example, the operator’s reluctance to switch 
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actions during an evasion maneuver can be modeled as a penalty (negative reward) for 
any step where a switch happens.  In this example a combination of both was used to 
against the excessive switching problem. 
 The main idea was to apply a penalty for any change of action happening after the 
initial alert.  At each decision point this requires comparing the action options to the 
previous action.  To recall the previous action, a new variable, 
aprev ∈ { Nominal, Climb }, must be added to the state.  The compete state is then s = { x, 
y, AS, aprev }.  Because the policy must assign an action for every possible combination 
of values of the state variables, this is potentially a function over Nx x Ny x NAS x Naprev 
states, where each factor is the number of values of the corresponding variable.  In this 
case the set of states can be reduced by noting that any combination where AS = Before 
and aprev = Climb at the same time is impossible.  This reduces the domain size by one 
fourth. 
 The new reward function for the current state and candidate action option is 
                                   Rs(s, a) + Rf(sf) if s = sf  (5.9) 
                                   Rs(s, a) otherwise  
where Rf(sf) is the original end-state reward function (5.5), which is independent of a and 
aprev, and Rs(s, a) is an additional switching “reward” term defined as 
-ρ  if a ≠ aprev and AS = After 
0 otherwise 
where ρ is the magnitude of the penalty for an action change.  The action utility functions 
are generated in a similar manner as before, solving backward from the end states, except 
at each state a penalty is subtracted from the expected next-state utility if aprev differs 
from the assumed next action. 
 
R(s, a) = 
Rs(s, a) = 
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 The resulting alerting policy is shown in figure 5.17, for an assumed penalty of 
0.01 per switch, and otherwise the same parameter values as before.  The alert threshold 
is not visibly changed by the new penalty.  There is significant change, however, to the 
after-alert switching thresholds.  Whereas the old policy allowed back-and-forth 
switching of guidance actions along a single contour, the new policy has two contours, 
one for each action, that are physically separated except along a shared boundary at the 
top of the alert contour.  The separation of the two contours makes rapid back-and-forth 
switching less likely to happen in the course of evasions similar to the one drawn.  In 
particular, the example scenario in figure 5.16 would most likely have ended with a 
continuous climb evasion if this policy were used. 
800 
600 
400 
200 
    
-200  
2015105 0  
x thousand ft
y  
ft
Alert threshold
Post-alert climb-to-nominal switching threshold
Ideal trajectory
Post-alert nominal-to-climb switching threshold
 
Figure 5.17: Action Switching Contours with Switching Penalty 
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5.6 SOC Performance Analysis 
The mentioned shared switching boundary is reachable by trajectories such as 
trajectory (a) in figure 5.18.  This feature remains despite the penalty on switching 
because, near the collision zone, the penalty is overwhelmed by a safety-related rapid loss 
of expected utility as the incident approaches.  In addition to this problem, another issue 
is the possibility of a trajectory like (b), which follows the upper edge of the alert 
threshold, and ends in a collision without ever triggering an alert.  Preventing scenarios 
like these could require further changes to the reward function or system dynamics, or 
adding more control options such as a descend action. 
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Figure 5.18: Problem Trajectories 
Whether changes are needed also depends on the likelihood of the failure.  If the 
prior probability of a failure scenario is low enough, the policy may be considered 
acceptable as it is.  To aid making design choices like this one, or to assess the overall 
benefit of an alerting system, global performance metrics such as prior incident 
probability (as mentioned) and unnecessary alert rates remain useful alongside utility 
decision metrics. 
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 The SOC plot in figure 5.19, for example, helps understand the performance of 
the example policy, and the effect of adding a switching penalty.  Random trajectories 
were generated beginning at a y position uniformly distributed between –1000 and 
1000 ft, and with the alerting logic generating alerts and guidance.  This was continued 
until 10,000 alerts occurred (many trajectories did not result in alerts).  Two versions of 
the logic were simulated in this way:  the original logic and the one with penalties on 
switching.  Only trajectories in which an alert (or missed detection, which is treated as an 
alert) occurred were used in generating the SOC plot, which describes the conditional 
probabilities of successful and unnecessary alerts, given that an alert happened.  As 
shown, the resulting safety is 0.991 for both, accurate within about 0.002 with 95% 
certainty.  Their difference is within 0.0026 with 95% certainty.  The unnecessary alert 
rates are 0.41 for the original and 0.40 for the version with penalties (within about 0.01 
with 95% uncertainty) and their difference is 0.01 within 0.014.  While the original logic 
produces an average of 1.4 action switches after the initial alert, the version with a 
switching penalty produces 0.04, or an approximate reduction by a factor of 35.  This is 
unsurprising, as the original logic guarantees at least one switch during any successful 
alert scenario, as figure 5.13 makes clear, and any penalty would likely prevent that 
switch. 
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Figure 5.19: Global Performance:  With and Without Switching Penalty 
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5.7 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter used a simple aircraft collision avoidance process to illustrate the use 
of Markov decision process modeling to generate an alerting logic from requirements.  
This involved 
• Identifying the Markov state of the process. 
• Describing alerting system outcome preferences in the form of a reward function, 
including defining new state variables if necessary. 
• Generating an efficient policy based on the state and reward function. 
Also included was a discussion of the need to tailor the alerting threshold and 
guidance to operator preferences and ability, and demonstration of one method of 
reducing undesirable guidance switching through state and reward function 
modifications.  Finally, the importance of using global performance analysis (such as 
Monte Carlo trajectory simulation) along with reward function design was discussed. 
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6. Aircraft Encounter with Uncertain Modes 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The 2-aircraft system from chapter 5 was convenient in that all of the necessary 
state variables, including position, alert status, and knowledge of the previous alerting 
system actions, were exactly known at all times.  This made the alerting problem 
amenable to basic MDP methods, including a straightforward policy solution.  Many 
systems of interest lack this property, making it necessary to estimate variables that are 
unmeasurable or poorly measurable.  A special case of this is where a system can operate 
in multiple modes, changing mode randomly and infrequently.  A particular Markov state 
and transition model might describe its behavior well most of the time, but badly on rare 
occasions, such as when a failure occurs in the system.  A discrete, but unmeasurable 
mode variable might then be defined as an index between the regular dynamics and an 
alternate model that better describes the other types of behavior. 
 In much of airspace, normal operations keep aircraft well separated through 
standard procedures or air traffic control oversight.  Collisions, when they occur, tend to 
happen after a breakdown of these mechanisms.  This is an instance where an 
unobservable mode variable could improve a Markov model over what is possible with a 
fully observable encounter model like the one from chapter 5. 
6.2 Modified Aircraft Encounter System  
 Figure 6.1 sketches a multiple mode encounter similar to one considered by 
Kuchar (Kuchar, 1995).  The evader nominally flies level and at a constant speed.  The 
intruder aircraft descends from above and is supposed to level off at an altitude a safe 
distance D above the evader, as the relative trajectory shows.  There is a chance, 
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however, that it will instead continue descending at the initial rate, passing near or 
colliding with the evader.  The probabilities of these two events are 0.75 and 0.25 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Aircraft Encounter with Level-off Mode  
 As with the chapter 5 system the horizontal speeds of the aircraft are assumed 
constant and equal, with a total closing rate vclosing of 440 knots.  Horizontal position and 
time are discrete with increments of ∆x and ∆t.  The ∆x increment is 400 ft, for a ∆t of 
0.54 sec.  The initial descent rate vdescent of the intruder is 2500 ft/min and the level-off 
separation D is 1000 ft.  Prior to any alert and before leveling off, the nominal descent is 
described by the function 
y(k+1) = y(k) - vdescent ∆t (6.1) 
For the level-off mode and before any alert, the deceleration and level flying phase is 
described by the function 
y(k+1) = D + ∆ylevel(k) e-β ∆x (6.2) 
where ∆ylevel(k) is 
∆ylevel(k) = y(k) – D (6.3) 
Nominal level-off altitude 
Intruder 
Evader 
Level-off trajectory 
Descent trajectory 
D 
vclosing 
vdescent 
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which is the deviation of the intruder from the level-off separation.  The coefficient β is 
0.0003 1/ft, which results in a maximum vertical deceleration of 0.29g from the initial 
2500 ft/min descent rate or an average of about 0.08g over 17 s until a 1 ft/sec vertical 
rate is reached, assuming there is a smooth transition from the descend to the level-off 
function.  For the descend mode, the intruder instead maintains the vertical speed vdescent 
all the way to (nominally) a direct collision with the evader, so function (6.1) applies 
through the entire encounter. 
 After an alert the evader receives a climb command, and is assumed to accelerate 
instantaneously to vclimb, a 1500 ft/min climb rate.  This is to approximate a constant 
0.25g pull-up, which is a relatively aggressive maneuver spanning a shorter time 
compared to the level-off maneuver of the intruder. 
Prior to any alert, the evader is assumed to fly level at an altitude a distance D 
from the intruder’s level-off altitude.  Once the evader begins a climb, its relative position 
is no longer a valid reference point for predicting the level-off trajectory of the intruder.  
To resolve this issue it will be assumed in advance that alerts will not happen before the 
separation D has been reached.  Under this assumption the intruder will either have 
leveled off already, or be in descend mode where no reference altitude is required, when 
an alert happens.  The system dynamics following an alert are then approximately 
y(k+1) = y(k) - vclimb ∆t (6.4) 
if the intruder is in level-off mode, and 
y(k+1) = y(k) – (vdescent + vclimb) ∆t (6.5) 
if the intruder is in descend mode.  If an alert does occur before D is crossed, it will be 
assumed that the intruder has nearly finished leveling off if in level-off mode, and 
equation (6.4) will be applied.  It should be kept in mind that errors may be large in this 
range. 
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 Equations (6.1) through (6.5) describe the nominal dynamics of the system.  
Small disturbances in the vertical separation due to sensor error and other factors (wind, 
piloting error etc.) are modeled using a Gaussian white sequence input, vw, as in chapter 5 
y(k+1) = y(k) – (vdescent  + vw) ∆t (6.6) 
y(k+1) = D + ∆ylevel(k) e-β ∆x + vw ∆t (6.7) 
y(k+1) = y(k) – (vclimb + vw) ∆t (6.8) 
y(k+1) = y(k) – (vdescent + vclimb + vw) ∆t (6.9) 
This input describes the total deviation from the nominal path due to all noise and 
disturbances.  Since y is relative position, vw includes the uncertainties for both aircraft.  
With the level-off dynamics (6.7), the disturbance will cause y to drift randomly, but the 
exponential term will tend to counteract this and keep it near the level-off altitude in the 
long run.  When any of the other (constant vertical rate) functions are in effect, vw will 
induce random walk behavior, where the variance of vertical position uncertainty grows 
linearly with distance into the future (Brown & Hwang).  A vw value of 1560 ft/min (26 
ft/s) is assumed for all dynamic equations.  This leads to a 30 ft steady-state standard 
deviation for vertical position in the level-off mode, and in descend mode or during a 
climb a 108 ft standard deviation after 24,000 horizontal feet. 
Figure 6.2 shows the nominal level-off and descend-mode (or “blunder”) 
trajectories for the figure 6.1 scenario, along with randomly generated sample trajectories 
for the specified parameter values and without alerts.  Again, the evader is fixed at the 
origin so the relative position of the intruder is what varies with time.  Vertical separation 
is defined as the intruder altitude minus the evader altitude, so that the scenario begins 
with a positive vertical separation.  Horizontal separation is defined similarly. 
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Figure 6.2: Typical Relative Trajectories 
6.3 Policy with Belief State 
Unlike the variables x, y, AS, and aprev from the previous chapter, the encounter 
mode, which will be referred to as m, cannot be exactly determined at each time step.  
Knowledge of m is available in the form of a distribution over its two values.  The 
combination of m and its distribution is a belief state, as defined in section 2.3.1.  The 
domain of the belief state is the set of all possible distributions, of which there are an 
infinite number in this case.  Using a discrete approximation, figure 6.3 illustrates the 
domain of the m belief state as an orderly progression through the distribution space. 
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Figure 6.3: Discrete Mode Belief State Domain 
In the diagram, m0 is the level-off mode and m1 is the descend mode.  
Represented this way, there is little practical difference between the belief state of m and 
regular states.  Both kinds represent the current, complete knowledge or beliefs about 
variables in the Markov state, so both are needed to make the most accurate prediction of 
the future state and events.  Both kinds of state are observable in a sense, either by direct 
measurement or, for the belief state, by Bayes updating based on the previous belief state 
and input to the system. 
 The usual approach to MDP problems involving belief states (POMDPs) is to 
enumerate the belief state domain, if necessary using approximations such as the discrete 
set in figure 6.3 in place of the full domain, and to include an index for the belief state as 
a dimension of the state space (Russel & Norvig).  Adding the belief state index to the 
variables previously defined results in the total state 
s = { x, y, AS, aprev, BS } (6.10) 
where BS is the belief state index 
BS ∈ { b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 } (6.11) 
The state s has a domain at most the size of the product of the sizes of all 
component variables 
Ns = Nx x Ny x NAS x Naprev x NBS (6.12) 
which increases linearly with the number of possible belief states, NBS. 
b1 
m0  m1 m0  m1 m0  m1 m0  m1 m0  m1 
m 
Probability 
b5 b4 b3 b2 
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 For ease of finding a policy, the fewer states there are, the better.  As in the last 
example, some states in the above space are clearly not reachable by definition of the 
corresponding Markov dynamics and possible initial states:  any state where AS = Before 
and aprev ≠ a0 (defer) can be eliminated by replacing the two variables with a single 
combination state variable, CS, whose domain is only the possible combinations of those 
variables. 
s = { x, y, CS, BS } (6.13) 
Other than the addition of the belief state index, BS, this is similar to the state of the 
previous example system.  The constrained way the state space is traversed, with each x 
value occurring only once and in fixed order, is also similar.  An identical reward 
function can be used, and for simplicity an action switching cost of zero (see eq. 5.9) will 
be assumed.  The policy can be computed using the same procedure as before, starting at 
the end-state layer and working backward through state space to generate utility functions 
for the nominal and climb actions.   
 Figure 6.4 shows the alerting threshold in the x-y plane.  Because there is an 
additional dimension in the state space, several threshold contours are drawn, 
representing the different discrete belief states.  In other words, a contour crossing will 
only result in an alert if the belief state at that time is in the belief state range for the 
contour.  In actual use the alerting system will not be forced to choose one of the five 
discrete belief states in order to use the policy.  Instead, a belief state can be maintained 
in the full, continuous domain and used with interpolation to estimate the action utilities 
from the discrete policy.  The same method is also employed with the vertical position y, 
since the system dynamics are not discrete in that dimension. 
To show the boundaries more clearly, figure 6.5 draws the alert space for each 
belief state separately. 
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Figure 6.4: Threshold Contours for a Range of Belief States 
With the chosen parameters, an alert could apparently occur even before the level-
off separation is passed if the descend mode is completely certain (mode belief state      
bm = [ 0  1 ]).  On the other extreme, where there is zero probability of the descend mode 
(bm = [ 1  0 ]) the intruder would actually have to be at the same altitude or below the 
evader for an alert to be desirable.  In the co-altitude configuration the evader has a clear 
climb path and can easily escape at the last moment with little chance of an induced 
collision, regardless of the mode.  When the intruder approaches from above in descend 
mode, the possibility of an induced collision reduces the utility of the climb action 
relative to deferring.  In between the two belief state extremes (e.g. bm = [ 0.5  0.5 ]) there 
is greater uncertainty about the path of the intruder, so the alerting system tends to be 
defer alerts longer, knowing that an unnecessary alert and command reversal or an 
induced collision would likely result. 
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Figure 6.5: Threshold Contours Separated 
 Because the alerting threshold depends on the current mode belief state, 
continuous belief updating is necessary as described in chapter 4 and appendix A.  This 
means using measurements of observable state variables (position), the most recent belief 
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state, and the assumed dynamics for each mode to determine the most reasonable current 
mode distribution. 
6.4 Level-off Scenario 
 Figure 6.6 shows an idealized (with no disturbance input) level-off scenario, 
where the intruder begins at a 2500 ft/min descent speed and decelerates smoothly to stop 
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Figure 6.6: Level-Off Scenario 
at a target altitude 1000 ft above the evader.  In the process the outer alerting contour is 
crossed, but no alert occurs.  The reason for this is made clear in the plot underneath, 
which shows a trace of the different action utilities and the mode belief state (the 
descend-mode probability) over the course of the scenario.  Initially there is a 0.25 
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probability that the intruder will fail to level off, posing a significant danger to the 
evader.  As the intruder decelerates, which is more likely in the level-off mode than in the 
descend mode, the probability that the intruder is in the descend mode decreases to 0.03 
by the 17,500 ft horizontal separation point.  For this belief state to trigger an alert, the 
intruder would have to be at or below the altitude of the evader, since the entire alert 
space range for the belief state range [ 0.75  0.25 ] to [ 1  0 ] is below this altitude.  The 
contour crossed, corresponding to a descend-mode probability of 1, is not within this 
range, so no alert occurs. 
The alerting threshold was defined as where the alert (climb) action utility is 
equal to the deferral (nominal) action utility.  Outside of the threshold the deferral has a 
higher utility.  In the figure 6.6 utility trace the deferral utility is higher than the alert 
utility at all times, so no alert is ever needed.  As the descend-mode probability 
approaches zero, the deferral action utility increases toward its maximum possible value 
of 1.1, because in the level-off mode there is virtually no chance of a lower-utility 
trajectory (a collision or alert). 
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6.5 Descend Scenario 
Figure 6.7 shows an idealized descend-mode scenario with the same initial 
conditions as the level-off scenario.  Without any alert, the trajectory will end with a 
collision.  Following the alerting policy, an alert occurs at about 760 ft vertical 
separation.  The resulting climb action is continued until the end of the scenario.  
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Figure 6.7: Descend-Mode Scenario 
The initial descend-mode probability is again 0.25, but in this case the probability 
increases as evidence is gathered, and by the 15,000 ft horizontal position it has already 
reached 1 in the plot (visually, though in reality it never quite reaches 1).  The [ 0  1 ] 
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contour is encountered about 2,000 ft later.  Since the belief state is just under 1 when the 
[ 0  1 ] contour is crossed, the alert is triggered just inside that contour. 
 Before the alert there is still some chance of a safe, non-alert outcome for which 
the utility would be high (UCR = 1.1), and this keeps the deferral-action expected utility 
greater than 1 for the first part of the trajectory.  After the alert (marked with a vertical 
line) such an outcome is no longer possible and the greatest outcome utility possible is 1.  
An expected utility of 1 for an after-alert action means that there is no possibility of a 
collision occurring.  Otherwise the low utility of a collision outcome (Uincident =  0) would 
reduce the expected action utility.  In this scenario both the nominal and climb actions 
have nearly the same utility, near 1, after the alert and for the remainder of the encounter.  
The climb maneuver is aggressive enough that, if at any time during the evasion a 
nominal action is taken, the climb can be resumed at the next step with only a small loss 
of safety.  Thus, the nominal action has only slightly less utility and safety than the climb. 
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6.6 Action Switching After the Alert 
 The same policy that determines the alerting threshold is responsible for choosing 
alerting system actions after the alert occurs.  In the simple descend-mode example in 
figure 6.7, the optimal alerting input after the alert is to maintain the climb command 
until the end, because doing otherwise would reduce evasion safety. 
 Whereas previous scenarios were idealized examples of particular modes, figure 
6.8 is a scenario where the intruder behaves in a way that is improbable for either mode.   
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Figure 6.8: Abnormal Level-Off Scenario 
It begins with a constant-speed descent at 2500 ft/min, and levels off about 300 ft lower 
than usual, 11,500 horizontal ft from the evader. 
 105 
 Because the descend-mode probability has converged nearly to 1 by the time the 
level-off occurs, and because the intruder’s behavior is unlikely in either mode, no 
significant further change occurs in the belief state for the remainder of the scenario.  
Eventually, the logic sees that the climb maneuver is likely to cause a collision, assuming 
it is in the descend mode, and reverts back to the safer nominal action.  Thus, the alerting 
system is able to maximize safety after an alert by dynamically choosing guidance, a 
clear benefit in individual scenarios such as the above.  The final switch at 2,000 ft 
horizontal separation is the result the computed safety difference between the actions 
dropping to zero at that point, with climb being the default action. 
 Figure 6.9 shows the overall performance benefit of using reversible evasion 
maneuvers with this particular system and set of initial conditions, based on the assumed 
probabilistic dynamics.  Average performance data was generated using Monte Carlo 
trajectory simulation, with the system always beginning at the same position and mode 
belief state.  In one set post-alert command switching was allowed when needed, and in 
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Figure 6.9: Average Performance With and Without Reversible Maneuvers 
another the same threshold policy was used, but with the evader constrained to a fixed-
climb escape maneuver.  In each case trajectories were generated until 10,000 alerts 
occurred.  The resulting average collision rate, P(SA | Alert), is 0.9993 for both, or 
identical within the precision of this simulation.  The true unnecessary alert rate is known 
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to be the same for both since the same policy determines the threshold.  While providing 
no apparent safety benefit, the logic with switching caused on average 0.73 switches after 
the alert. 
6.7 Value of Anticipating Decision Opportunities 
 The MDP-based alerting method is distinct from other probabilistic alerting 
methods in that its decision metrics take into account the possibility of choosing between 
different actions at future times, so alerts are more informed and performance should be 
better.  The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the performance differences with 
specific alerting scenarios. 
 An alternate policy was generated where utilities were defined in terms of the 
probabilistic (SOC) quantities P(UA) and P(SA), the probabilities of an unnecessary alert 
and of a successful alert for an alert generated at that moment.  Assuming no alert has yet 
occurred, these were defined as the probability of no incident for each alert option, where 
the options are either a sustained deferral or a sustained climb respectively.  In other 
words, the assumption is that each option is a complete action sequence covering all 
future time.  This assumption is borrowed from recent research probabilistic alerting 
systems research (Carpenter & Kuchar; Yang & Kuchar, 1997).  P(UA) is undefined after 
the alert, but an analogous metric for the post-alert case could be called P(SN) (Safe 
Nominal trajectory), defined as the probability of no incident if only nominal actions 
follow.  The two relevant metrics after the alert would be P(SA) and P(SN).  The reward 
function was defined similarly to the regular policy:  safe non-alert end states give utility 
1.1, safe alert outcomes give 1, and collisions give 0. 
 The resulting alerting threshold is shown in figure 6.10 along with a level-off 
mode trajectory.  Because the assumption is a that a nominal action will be irreversible if 
chosen, that action appears to be a hazardous and low-utility option at the intruder’s 
initial position, which is on a nominal collision course with the evader for the descend 
mode.  Even with a descend-mode probability of only 0.25, the overall probability of a 
collision lowers the expected utility to nearly 0.8.  The climb option is relatively safe, and 
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even though it ensures a maximum outcome utility no greater than 1, it has a higher 
expected utility at the outset. 
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Figure 6.10: SOC-Metric-Based Alert Policy and Level-Off Scenario 
The result is that an alert happens immediately.  The mode belief updating process 
continues after the alert, and when the intruder levels off at 19,500 ft separation, 
P(descend mode) converges to near zero within 2,000 ft with the evasion in progress.  At 
this point the climb trajectory is seen to be less safe than the nominal trajectory, so the 
nominal action is chosen.  So, the logic is able to safely guide the aircraft after the alert, 
but has committed an unnecessary alert that would have been avoided by the regular logic 
in this scenario (figure 6.6). 
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 In the descend-mode case (figure 6.11) the alert is triggered at the same time.  No 
switching occurs after the alert, because once mode uncertainty is eliminated the climb 
path is clearly the safest option.  The policy has successfully avoided a collision.  The 
regular policy also avoids the collision (figure 6.7), but defers the alert until after the 
mode becomes more certain.  The SOC-based policy’s maneuver avoids the collision by a 
larger margin, so in one sense gave the more desirable response, but at the cost of a 
higher unnecessary alert probability. 
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Figure 6.11: SOC-Metric-Based Alert Policy with Descend-Mode Scenario 
 Because individual scenarios can favor either policy, it is informative to compare 
average performance over many scenarios representative of the intended operating 
environment.  Figure 6.12 compares the average performance of the two policies, where 
trajectories were simulated with each to generate 10,000 alert cases, based on the 
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encounter dynamic model defined in section 6.1, and all beginning at the same initial 
position and belief state.  The metrics used are the average successful alert rate and the 
average unnecessary alert rate. 
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Figure 6.12: Average SOC Performance Comparison for Standard Policy vs.     
SOC-Based Threshold 
As the example scenarios suggest, for a correct rejection utility of UCR = 1.1, the 
SOC-based policy has a safety advantage.  The SOC policy avoided any collisions, 
compared to 7 collisions in 10,000 alerts for the regular policy.  At the same time, the 
SOC policy suffers from a relatively high rate of unnecessary alerts.  In a simulation of 
10,000 level-off trajectories, the regular policy caused no alerts, while the SOC-based 
policy caused an alert every time. 
 Figure 6.13 shows the SOC logic as a region in the SOC space.  The alert space is 
the shaded area bounded by a diagonal line through the origin.  The slope of the line is 
equal to the parameter UCR.  At each point in time, the policy generates SOC coordinates, 
and if these lie outside of the shaded region, the alert is deferred (or the nominal action is 
taken, if an alert has already happened).  From this representation the location of the 
operating point in figure 6.12 is seen to depend on the SOC threshold slope, which at 1.1 
is only slightly steeper than the diagonal. 
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Figure 6.13: SOC-Space Threshold 
  If UCR is increased, the slope increases, which should result in deferred alerts and 
a reduced unnecessary alert rate, given that scenario trajectories originate near the top, 
right corner of the SOC plot.  UCR was varied over a range of 1.1 to 3 and the resulting 
range of average performance is shown as a curve in figure 6.12.  Along with the 
expected reduction in the unnecessary alert rate, there is a gradual decrease in average 
safety.  When the operating point reaches a point directly below the regular policy’s SOC 
position, the overall unnecessary alert rates are the same, and the SOC policy has a 
P(SA | Alert) of 0.98 compared to the regular policy’s 0.999, or 20 times the collision 
probability, given an alert.  From a 10,000 level-off trajectory simulation, the level-off 
mode unnecessary alert rate at that point is roughly 4 in 1,000 for the SOC policy, 
compared to none for the regular policy.  The total alert rate (level-off and descend cases) 
is similar for both at 23 per 100.  The significance of these differences depends on the 
particular alerting application, but there is a clear difference between the two policy 
types, with the MDP-based policy allowing a higher overall safety and fewer total and 
level-off alerts with the assumed dynamics. 
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 As discussed in section 2.3, there is a more general philosophy that the alerting 
region in SOC space should take whatever shape necessary to optimize performance.  For 
example, figure 6.14 shows two additional possibilities, each aimed at directly controlling 
an aspect of performance.  The minimum safety threshold ensures that alerting safety is at 
or above a specified limit, T.  The maximum unnecessary alert probability threshold 
defers alerts until the unnecessary alert probability, a measure of the need for the alert, is 
acceptably small. 
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Figure 6.14: Other SOC-Space Thresholds 
 Figure 6.15 shows corresponding SOC curves for the figure 6.14 logics, generated 
by varying the tradeoff parameter T over a range.  Again, these logics are unable to reach 
the same trade-off of safety for unnecessary alerts that the MDP-based logic does. 
 The MDP logic compares favorably with the SOC-based logic because of its more 
complete use of information available in the belief state and in recognizing future 
decision opportunities.  It is also a result of the reward function chosen for this example, 
which was constructed with SOC design goals in mind.  In general, it should be noted, 
these may not be the real goals of every alerting system.  For example, in systems with 
normal and failure modes (e.g.  Parallel landing approaches (Winder & Kuchar, 1999)) an 
alert might be considered proper if it occurs during a failure, even if it is an unnecessary 
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alert.  The utility basis of the MDP method is general enough to accommodate such 
differences. 
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Figure 6.15: Performance of Other SOC-Based Thresholds 
6.8 Belief State Modeling Simplification 
 The MDP-based alerting method assumes that uncertain state variables like modes 
require maintaining and using a belief state.  As described in chapter 2, keeping the belief 
state current involves a continual filtering process done in real time.  The belief state is 
then used as an input, along with other state variables, to a pre-computed policy that 
identifies the best action to take.  Like other continuous state variables it is often 
necessary to simplify its domain for describing the policy, such as in the example in this 
chapter where a continuous range of mode distributions was replaced with a small, 
discrete set.  The smaller the domain, the easier it is to compute a policy using the belief 
state as a variable.  However, oversimplifying the belief state domain could unacceptably 
impact performance.  This section will discuss the relationship of the degree of belief 
state simplification to the performance of the alerting system. 
 The simplest way to reduce the complexity of belief state variables is to assume 
the system is in one or the other mode, and do no belief updating.  For example, one 
option is to assume level-off dynamics always hold.  In figure 6.16, this limits the alert 
space to some region within the belief state rage between P(descend) = 0 and 0.25.  
While never alerting during level-off scenarios, during descend mode scenarios this logic 
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Figure 6.16: Belief State Simplification – Assume No Descend Mode 
can allow collisions without providing any alert (missed detections), or issue alerts too 
late (late alerts). 
 The other extreme case is to assume that the descend mode always holds     
(figure 6.17).  Now the reverse problem happens:  safety during descend-mode scenario 
is ensured, while unnecessary alerts happen during many level-off cases, since the 
threshold contour extends beyond the nominal level-off separation. 
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Figure 6.17: Belief State Simplification – Assume No Level-off Mode 
 Eliminating one mode or the other as discussed has a significant negative effect 
on the performance of the logic, either increasing unnecessary alerts or reducing safety.  
A third possible belief state simplification is a 2-value domain including both of the 
extreme belief cases already considered separately.  Recall that the discrete belief state 
model used in the original policy was a 5-value progression of belief states separated by 
probability increments of 0.25.  Utility function matrices were created over this set, one 
for each action.  Then, to generate action utilities for a given belief state, linear 
interpolation was done between discrete elements of the utility matrices.  The suggestion 
is to reduce the discrete domain to the smallest set that accounts for both of the extreme 
belief states, and then assume there is a linear relationship between the belief state and 
the action utility. 
 A policy was found for this belief state model and examined in a similar way to 
previous examples.  Because at each extreme belief state there is no possibility of a belief 
updating cycle changing the belief state, the simplified policy can be found by removing 
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the middle three belief cases from the existing policy.  This is because once the belief 
state reaches one extreme or other, no future evidence gathered can change the belief 
state, making the policy at each extreme belief state independent of that at any other 
belief state. 
 Figure 6.18 compares the utility traces resulting from each policy version and the 
idealized descend-mode scenario.  Visually they are nearly the same. They both result in  
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Figure 6.18: Utility Trace Comparison:  2 vs. 5-Belief-State Simplification 
deferring the alert until the mode uncertainty is nearly eliminated, and they both result in 
an alert at the same moment.  The policies also react similarly to a level-off scenario, 
each avoiding an unnecessary alert. 
 Compared using the Monte Carlo scenario simulation described in section 6.6 
with 10,000 alert scenarios, they both had P(SA | Alert) values of 0.9993, and the 
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sampling error of their difference is 0.001 or less with 95% certainty.  The unnecessary 
alert fractions are 0.314 for the regular logic and 0.322 for the 2-belief state version, 
different by 0.008.  The standard deviation of the sample difference is 0.007, so there is 
not a clear difference in the unnecessary alert probability between the two logics.  Based 
on 30,000 trajectory level-off simulations, the logics had level-off-mode unnecessary 
alert rates of 25 (the original) and 19 (2-belief state) per 100,000 level-offs.  For the given 
sample size (30,000), there is no clear difference in level-off alert performance between 
the two logics. 
 A possible explanation for the similarity is, besides any coincidental linearity in 
the actual utility functions, that the structure of the system and utility definitions cause 
alerts to be put off in every case until mode uncertainty is nearly gone.  This means that 
at the alerting threshold, the belief state is always P(descend-mode) ≈ 1, which is a belief 
state where action utilities were computed precisely for both policies.  The utilities at the 
threshold are then expected to be similar, even with an approximation of the utility 
function.  To avoid unnecessary alerts in the interval up to this point, it is only necessary 
that both policies have nominal action utility greater than the climb action utility, so some 
error due to utility function approximation is tolerable. 
6.9 Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter the use of uncertain modes in an alerting system was investigated, 
using the example of a 2-aircraft encounter where, depending on an uncertain mode 
variable, the aircraft may or may not be in danger of colliding.  A Markov state was 
defined for the 2-aircraft system, including a belief state for the mode.  This state, a 
corresponding dynamic model and a reward function describing alerting priorities were 
used to generate the alerting logic, or “policy.”  Operation of the policy, both as an 
alerting threshold and as a post-alert guidance logic, was shown with example scenarios. 
 The value of taking future decisions into account, as the policy inherently does, 
was shown using example scenarios and with global performance averages generated by 
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Monte Carlo trajectory simulation.  This involved defining alternative policies where 
fixed maneuvers were the assumed choices. 
 The importance of the mode belief state and belief updating process to effective 
alerting was shown.  This was accomplished by looking at the effect of disabling the 
mode-update process in example scenarios, and comparing global performance metrics 
from Monte Carlo simulation.  In addition it was shown that for acceptable alerting 
performance a policy may require only limited information about the belief state, 
depending on the situation.  A simplified belief state domain was compared to a more 
complete belief state model in discussing this. 
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7. Summary and Contributions 
 
7.1 Summary 
 In this thesis a framework for designing hazard avoidance alerting systems was 
presented, based on a Markov decision process model of alerting, and motivated by 
identified weaknesses with existing methods.  Two alerting “logics” were created using 
the framework and were compared in terms of standard performance measures to logics 
created with more typical methods, demonstrating a benefit. 
The use of MDP methods was motivated by a lack of certain features in existing 
methods for direct derivation of alerting logics from performance requirements.  One of 
these is the ability to reason about future decision opportunities that might influence the 
current decision.  In particular, such knowledge is important for placement of the alerting 
threshold, because it is what allows deferral of alerts:  knowing whether safe options will 
be available in the future affects the current decision.  Another desired feature is the 
ability to model and account for uncertain dynamic modes in the observed situation.  
Modes describe distinct types of behavior a system could exhibit at a given time, and 
uncertainty in the mode complicates the state predictions needed for decision making.  
Mode uncertainty also motivates being aware of future decision opportunities, because 
actions have predictable effects on mode uncertainty.  In particular, alerts may be 
deferred partly in expectation of decreasing mode uncertainty. 
The MDP-based methodology requires a Markov state and probabilistic dynamic 
model of the operator-plant system, a probabilistic observation model, and creation of a 
reward function that describes the alerting system’s (designer’s) goals in terms of 
cumulative rewards that can be gained along future system trajectories.  Uncertain mode 
variables are modeled probabilistically, and the resulting distribution, or belief state, can 
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be updated at each step to reflect changes in the uncertainty due to new evidence.  With 
these components, MDP theory provides means to derive an efficient alerting policy that 
allows computations for alerting decisions to be done in real time.  The policy determines 
both the threshold for alerts and the later sequence of cues that guide an operator during 
resolution of the hazard.  
The policy is a function of the current system state that produces the best action 
from an available set.  The state can be a set of variables or a distribution over 
variables—a belief state—including mode variables.  In the belief state case the solution 
can be less straightforward, but methods exist. 
The policy inherently takes into account future decisions through application of 
Bellman’s equation, which itself is an effect of the principle of optimality.  Under an 
assumption of utility-based preferences, this principle says that the utility of an action at a 
given state depends only on the utility of reaching the next state, assuming the next-state 
utility is optimal (maximized).  Thus, choosing the next action requires no assumption of 
any particular trajectory being followed later. 
The MDP-based methodology was used to derive alerting logics for two kinds of 
aircraft encounter, one a head-on collision scenario with random altitude variations, and 
the other an uncertain 2-mode scenario with a safe (level-off) and an unsafe (continued 
descent) mode.  These case studies demonstrated how alerting system goals can be 
expressed as a reward function, computation of an alerting policy, and use of the policy 
as an alerting and guidance threshold.  The second case study also showed the modeling 
of an uncertain mode, effects of the mode on policy computation, and the behavior of the 
resulting logic.  In the second case study the MDP-based alerting logic was tested against 
alternate logics designed according to current practice using standard performance 
metrics, and the performance benefits of MDP design were made apparent.  The 
importance of using global average performance metrics, including traditional metrics 
like unnecessary alert and incident rates, alongside reward function requirements was 
also explained. 
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A claim is made that the reward function basis of the alerting process must agree 
with or complement the alerting preferences of the human operators.  This is to minimize 
the rate of improper alerts, defined as alerts that the operators find incorrect, and which 
include nuisance alerts.  However, at this time there is no clear description of this 
relationship to guide design of the reward function.  In the case studies a simple reward 
function was chosen that makes a trade-off between safety and unnecessary alerts at the 
threshold.  Trading off safety for unnecessary alerts is an established practice in alerting 
design.  The resulting performance compares well with SOC-based alerting, where a 
threshold is defined in the space of P(SA) and P(UA).  In terms of the global SOC 
performance metrics, the MDP-based logic achieves superior safety to compared SOC-
based logics for a given unnecessary alert rate.  In addition the MDP-based logic is better 
able to avoid alerts during level-off mode scenarios while maintaining a given level a 
safety. 
 The case study systems were made purposely simple for clarity.  This leaves a 
question of whether MDP methods will also apply to more complex alerting systems 
requiring more state variables.  In principle they do, but because the number of states can 
increase exponentially with the number of state variables, it is easily possible to run into 
computing speed and memory limits (Bellman called this problem the “curse of 
dimensionality.”)  As a consequence, more complex alerting systems may require policy 
or utility function approximations that reduce the number of variables and states.  The 
tabular utility function representation and policy derivation methods that were convenient 
in the case studies may be too inefficient for use general. 
7.2 Contributions 
A new methodology was described for designing hazard avoidance alerting 
systems, based on Markov decision process theory.  It has a number of advantages: 
1. It provides a means of generating an efficient alerting logic directly from 
requirements, reducing the need for design iterations to meet goals. 
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a. It was demonstrated with aviation alerting case studies having the core 
elements of more complex alerting problems. 
b. The use of a utility model of performance requirements was described and 
demonstrated. 
2. It makes complete use of available information, including 
a. Information about mode uncertainty. 
b. Information about future states and decision opportunities; in particular, 
whether deferring an alert leaves sufficient flexibility for future action, and 
whether future observations will reduce mode uncertainty. 
3. It unifies the design of the alerting threshold and guidance, including when flexible 
escape guidance is needed.  This allows knowledge about future guidance to directly 
affect the threshold.  Earlier efforts have focused on optimal definition of the alerting 
threshold or have assumed fixed escape maneuvers. 
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Definitions 
 
Action A decision option available to the alerting system 
Action logic Component of the alerting system that chooses the 
alerting action based on the current belief state and 
previous action 
Action space Set of possible alerting system actions 
AILS NASA Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing 
collision avoidance logic for parallel approach 
collision avoidance 
Alerting system Automation that monitors a human-operated system 
and issues alerts and guidance to avoid unexpected 
hazards 
Belief compression Refers to methods of approximating a range of 
belief states with a simpler function having fewer 
parameters 
Belief space The set of all possible belief states 
Belief state A probability distribution over the situation space 
that describes alerting system uncertainty about the 
state 
Bellman equation Fundamental equation of MDP theory that describes 
the relationship of the maximum expected utility at 
each state to that of neighboring states, reachable by 
a single action 
CD Correct detection 
Correct detection A state trajectory in which an alert occurs, 
preventing an incident that would have happened 
otherwise 
Correct rejection A state trajectory in which no alert occurs and no 
incident occurs 
CR Correct rejection 
Deferral action Also nominal action.  The alerting system action 
prior to any alert occurring, when it is passively 
monitoring 
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Escape maneuver A maneuver due to repeatedly using a given 
maneuver policy after an alert has occurred 
Evader Aircraft that is assumed to receive and respond to 
alerts to avoid the intruder 
Evidence Information gathered by the alerting system in the 
form of observations of the situation and recalled 
past actions 
Expected utility function Function mapping each state into an expected utility 
Filtering The process of updating the a belief state, given a 
stream of observations 
Finite horizon A class of Markov decision processes in which 
there is assumed to be a finite time remaining 
before the process ends 
Fully observable The exact situation state is available through a 
single observation 
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System.  Alerting 
system for preventing “controlled flight into terrain” 
accidents 
Hazard space The set of all situation states where it is possible for 
an incident to occur 
IA Improper alert 
II Induced incident 
Improper alert An alerting system action that an operator believes 
is incorrect 
Incident An undesirable event that an alerting system is 
designed to prevent from happening 
Induced incident An incident that occurs after an alert happens, that 
would not have occurred without the alert 
Infinite horizon A class of Markov decision processes in which 
there is assumed to be no end point 
Intruder Aircraft that may endanger the evader and is 
assumed not controllable by the alerting system 
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Knowledge The total information available to the alerting 
system about the situation through observations and 
prior knowledge.  The belief state 
LA Late alert 
Late alert An alert that is necessary but happens too late to 
prevent an incident 
Maneuver Sequential use of a single maneuver policy over 
some interval 
Maneuver policy A function that maps a state or belief state into a 
specific alerting system action 
Markov property The property of a state whereby knowing the state 
allows a correct state prediction (exact or 
probabilistic prediction) 
Maximum expected utility function Function mapping each state into the largest 
expected utility possible for a set of possible actions 
Maximum expected utility principle Decision criterion stating that the preferred decision 
is the one that gives the maximum expected 
outcome utility 
MD Missed detection 
MDP Markov decision process 
Missed detection A case where an incident happens without any prior 
alert 
Mode A discrete state variable that represents distinct 
dynamic behaviors a system can exhibit 
NA Nuisance alert 
Nominal action A deferral action by the alerting system 
Nominal maneuver Assuming no alert has occurred, the maneuver due 
to repeating the deferral action indefinitely 
Nuisance alert An improper alert where an operator considers the 
alert unjustified 
Observation A situation state measurement at a given time 
Observation space The set of possible observations for a particular 
state space and sensor function 
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Operator A human operating within a larger situation, who 
can receive alerts from an alerting system 
Partially observable Refers to a situation where an observation does not 
provide the exact and entire state 
Plant A system controlled by operators within a situation 
Policy
 A function that maps any state (or belief state) into 
a particular action 
Policy iteration A method of finding a policy for an MDP that 
involves alternately computing the utility function 
implied by a candidate policy, and calculating a 
new candidate policy from the utility function 
POMDP Partially observable Markov decision process 
Precision Runway Monitor Alerting system for preventing collisions during 
closely spaced parallel approaches 
Principle of optimality In a sequential decision process, maximizing the 
utility of the system trajectory (past and future) 
implies maximizing the utility of the future 
trajectory. 
Prior belief state A belief state that is assumed given at the start of a 
Markov decision process 
PRM Precision runway monitor 
Reward function A function defined over state space that specifies 
the reward gained by the alerting system when the 
state is occupied 
SA Successful alert 
SN Safe nominal trajectory 
Sensor function A function that maps the situation state into an 
observation 
Situation A system composed of human operators and a plant 
that they control 
Situation space The set of possible situation states 
Situation state The Markov state describing a situation 
SOC System operating characteristic 
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State A state vector 
State vector A set of variables that together describe the 
condition of a system at a given time 
Stationary Refers to a function that remains unchanged with 
passing time 
Successful alert An alert that is not followed by an incident 
System Operating Characteristic A pair of performance metrics, either the probability 
of a safe alert and the probability of an unnecessary 
alert, given that an alert happens, or the frequency 
of a safe alert and of an unnecessary alert given that 
an alert happens. 
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System.  An 
alerting system for preventing mid-air collisions 
between aircraft 
Trajectory utility function A function mapping a state trajectory into a utility 
value 
Transition function The function describing the future state or state 
distribution for a given initial state and control 
(action) input 
UA Unnecessary alert 
Unnecessary alert An alert that is not followed by an incident, but 
where no incident would have occurred without the 
alert 
Unsuccessful alert An alert followed by an incident 
Utility A scalar value describing the degree of desirability 
or goodness of something 
Utility function See trajectory utility function.  Also, short for a 
maximum expected utility function 
Value iteration A method of solving Markov decision problems, 
where the correct maximum expected utility 
function is arrived at through iterative application of 
the Bellman equation to a candidate utility function 
over the entire state domain, each time using the 
most recent utility function 
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Appendix A:  Overview of Belief State Filtering 
 
Consider a discrete-time alerting process described by the following components: 
1. A situation state, s 
2. An alert signal, a 
3. An observation signal o determined by a sensor function, O( o(k) | s(k) ) 
4. A state transition function, T( s(k+1) | s(k), a(k) ) 
5. Prior knowledge about s in the form of a probability distribution, bs(0)( s(0) ) 
The functions O(⋅) and T(⋅) are in the form of probability distributions over the 
spaces of o and s, respectively. 
 At each point in time, an observation ( o(k) ) is made and an action ( a(k) ) is 
taken by the alerting system.  After k time steps, beginning with k = 0, the entire history 
of these values is: 
{ o(0), a(0), o(1), a(1), … , o(k-1), a(k-1), o(k) } 
 or more compactly, 
{ e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1), o(k) } 
where e(i) is the “evidence” from time step i: 
e(i)  =  { o(i), a(i) }. 
 This history is the complete set of observable evidence concerning the situation.  
By definition, the belief state at k is the probability distribution of s(k), conditioned on 
all of this evidence: 
bs(k)( s(k) )  =  p( s(k) | e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1), o(k) ) 
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Applying the definition of conditional probability, this becomes: 
=  α  p( o(k) | s(k), e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1) )  p( s(k) | e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1) ) 
where α is a normalization constant that makes the distribution sum to 1.  The rightmost 
factor is the conditional probability distribution of the current state on all past observable 
evidence.  The middle factor is the conditional distribution of the current observation on 
the current state and all previous observations and actions.  Since the observation depends 
on the current state and nothing else (by definition of the sensor function), the expression 
simplifies to: 
=  α  p( o(k) | s(k) )  p( s(k) | e(0), e(k1), … , e(k-1) ) 
To evaluate the last factor, it can be expanded to show the implicit conditioning of s(k) 
on the previous state, s(k-1): 
p( s(k) | e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1) )  = 
Σ
 p( s(k) | s(k-1), e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1) )  p( s(k-1)
 
| e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1) ) 
The summation is of s(k-1) over the space S.  Due to the Markov property assumed for s, 
this simplifies to: 
=  Σ p( s(k) | s(k-1), a(k-1) )  p( s(k-1)
 
| e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1) ) 
So the belief state is: 
bs(k)( s(k) )  =   
α  p( o(k) | s(k) )  Σ p( s(k) | s(k-1), a(k-1) )  p( s(k-1)
 
| e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1) ) 
Note that p( o(k) | s(k) ) is just the sensor function, and p( s(k) | s(k-1), a(k-1) ) is the 
transition function.  The distribution p( s(k-1)
 
| e(0), e(1), … , e(k-1) ) is the belief state 
for the previous time step, bs(k-1)( s(k-1) ), assuming that it reduces to p( s(k-1) | e(0), 
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e(1), … , o(k-1) ) due to causality (the action a(k-1) is chosen after the belief state for  
s(k-1) is determined, so it should not influence that belief state). 
To summarize in more explicit notation, the belief state is: 
bs(k)( s(k) )  =  α  O( o(k) | s(k) )  Σ T( s(k) | s(k-1), a(k-1) )  bs(k-1)( s(k-1) ) 
Thus, for the assumed observation and transition functions, there is a recursive 
calculation for the belief state.  Once the belief state is calculated for one time step, that 
belief state along with the next action and observation will allow a calculation of the 
same effort for the next belief state.  At initiation of the process, when there is no 
previously computed belief state, a prior belief state, bs(0)( s(0) ), must be assumed. 
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Appendix B:  
Common Philosophies of Alerting Logic Design 
 
 Three common philosophies of alerting logic design have been identified to 
classify existing or proposed hazard alerting systems.  Following is a more detailed and 
general description of each philosophy.  Parallel approach collision prevention serves as 
an example. 
B.1 Trajectory Conformance Monitoring 
 This type of logic uses non-conformance of a system to established procedures as 
a basis for alerting.  For example, figure B.1 shows a system state with respect to a 
normal operating region in state space.  If the state exits outside the normal operating 
region an alert is issued.  The system exists to prevent occurrences of a hazard, but no 
explicit prediction of a hazard event is required for triggering an alert.  As shown, the 
normal region is defined so as to be mutually exclusive of the hazard, even though the 
hazard is not explicitly modeled in the final algorithm.  In PRM, for example, as long as 
both aircraft remain outside the NTZ, the hazard cannot occur.  An aircraft entering the 
NTZ will trigger an alert whether or not it actually threatens another aircraft. 
 
                                                                                               
 
 
Figure B.1: Trajectory Conformance Alerting 
A deviation (“blunder”) from the normal procedure is a necessary precursor to a hazard 
event, so it can be argued that an observed deviation from normal is sufficient reason for 
an alert and corrective action, provided such a policy does not result in a high rate of 
Normal states defined by procedure 
System state Hazard (unmodeled) 
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alerts occurring without a blunder.  Frequent unnecessary alerts during normal system 
operation would come to be perceived as incorrect by operators, and might in time cause 
operators to ignore or delay responding to alerts. 
 In addition to establishing that the non-blunder alert rate is acceptably low, it 
should be shown that when a blunder does occur there will be an evasive maneuver 
having an adequate likelihood of success.  Such an analysis typically involves a reference 
dynamic model of the system, and iterative adjustment of the threshold.  Because of the 
dependence of the threshold on the operational procedure, it may be necessary to adjust 
the procedure itself to achieve performance goals.  For example, it was concluded that 
PRM could be used with parallel runways spaced no less than 3400 feet apart because 
below this spacing the likelihood of safe resolution of a blunder was too low in 
simulation studies. 
B.2 Nominal Trajectory Hazard Prediction (Unnecessary Alert 
Prevention) 
This alerting strategy involves continuous checking for a particular hazard 
through explicit prediction of the non-alert, or nominal, system trajectory (figure B.2).  
For an alert to occur, the hazard event must be predicted.  Under this philosophy, the 
logic avoids alerts that are not clearly justified with respect to the hazard.  The hazard is  
 
 
 
 
Figure B.2: Nominal Trajectory Prediction Alerting 
described in terms of a set of state variables composing a state space.  The trajectory 
model, which might be probabilistic, worst case, or a single predicted trajectory, is 
System state 
Predicted nominal (non-alert) trajectory 
Hazard 
Maximum prediction time 
criterion 
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propagated forward in this state space from the current, measured location.  In the figure 
B.2 example, the trajectory model is a worst case model, and is predicting that a hazard 
may be encountered in the future. 
Due to uncertainty in prediction and the consequent possibility of unnecessary 
alerts, it is insufficient to define the alerting rule as “alert when a hazard is predicted.”  
Typically an additional metric or metrics are required for threshold definition.  Possible 
metrics include the degree of certainty in occurrence of a predicted event (for a 
probabilistic trajectory model), or the predicted time-to-collision (for worst case or 
single-trajectory models).  The values of threshold parameters must be chosen to satisfy 
both safety and unnecessary alert goals.  In the illustrated example, collision prediction 
time is the metric and a particular value of this must be selected to define the threshold.  
Using a reference model of the behavior of the entire human-controlled system (able to 
describe its dynamics both before and after an alert occurs, and covering all possible 
initial conditions in state space), optimal threshold parameters are determined, typically 
through repeated Monte Carlo simulation and adjustment (Yang & Kuchar, 2000). 
 Whether a hazard is imminent for the nominal trajectory is not a direct indication 
of whether an evasion maneuver will be safe.  In this type of logic, the justification of 
alerts is inherently stressed over the safety of the alerting decision. 
In the course of analysis, the complexity of the logic may increase to cover 
special cases that were not initially foreseen.  This is likely when few state variables are 
available for measurement or the actual system dynamics are not well understood.  An 
example is the development of TCAS logic for midair collision prevention.  This logic 
began with a simple range rate and time-to-collision prediction model (with adjustable 
parameters for the threshold prediction time and miss distance) characterized by large 
trajectory errors, and was eventually augmented with conditional statements and new 
parameters in order to handle problem scenarios (Drumm, 1996).  For example, a 
situation where two aircraft unknowingly fly parallel at the same speed may be 
unacceptable, yet trigger no alerts when using a time-to-collision criterion only.  To cover 
such problem scenarios additional checks were added to the logic. 
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 Other examples of logics that use explicit incident prediction as the basis of 
thresholds are GPWS and AILS. 
B.3 Existence of Safe Escape Options (Safety Monitoring) 
 In general there may be specific completion conditions that must be met in order 
for a potential incident to be considered resolved, and it is possible to make deferral of 
alerts conditional on the predicted attainment of such conditions.  For example, the MIT 
logic issues alerts based on knowledge that a collision will probably not occur within a 
certain period of time following the alert. 
 This type of logic is superficially similar to the nominal trajectory hazard 
checking method described in section B.2 in that it involves a trajectory model.  As 
illustrated in figure B.3, a hazard event is once again defined in terms of measurable state 
variables.  A trajectory model is used to propagate the system state, but this time under 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure B.3: Ensuring that Safe Options Exist 
the assumption that an alert has occurred or will occur at a particular time, resulting in 
escape maneuvers.  In general there may be multiple maneuver options (represented by 
evolving state envelopes—each resembling a horn—in figure B.3), corresponding to 
different warning inputs that can be issued to operators.  Completion conditions are 
defined in terms of the evasion trajectory and state variables.  As shown, completion 
conditions may require that the system reach a specific region in state space.  In addition, 
it may be required that the system reach the completion state set within a particular time 
Predicted post-alert trajectories for different maneuvers 
State variable criteria for 
   a completed escape 
Hazard System state 
 141 
interval.  Finally, if the hazard is some catastrophe, then the completion state set cannot 
intersect with the set of hazard states and be considered as part of a desirable alerting 
outcome. 
If a probabilistic trajectory model is to be used, then alerting decisions will be 
based on the probability of reaching the completion state set within the required time 
interval.  Therefore an additional component of completion is a threshold probability, 
such that above this an alerting decision is considered safe. 
 If the trajectory model is worst case or a single trajectory, safety requires that all 
trajectories for an alerting option reach the completion set within a given time interval.  
Safety is marginal if any one of the trajectories reaches a boundary value of the 
completion state set or allowed time interval. 
According to this philosophy an alert may be deferred as long as an available 
alerting option is safe.  An alert can no longer be deferred when safety becomes marginal.  
In other words, an alert is considered justified when there may be no safe option 
remaining at the next alerting opportunity. 
In this method safety is fixed at the threshold, resulting in a loss of direct control 
over unnecessary alerts.  This is because whether a post-alert maneuver is safe is not a 
direct indication of whether the nominal system trajectory is safe (i.e. whether an alert 
will be an unnecessary alert).  For example, it may be possible for an evasion option to 
become marginally unsafe, triggering an alert, even when no hazard would be 
encountered on the nominal trajectory. 
 
References 
Drumm, A. C.  (1996).  Lincoln Laboratory Evaluation of TCAS II Logic Version 6.04a.  
Volume I.  Lincoln Laboratory, MIT.  Lexington, MA. 
 
Yang, Lee C. & James K. Kuchar.  (2000).  Aircraft Conflict Analysis and Real-Time 
Conflict Probing Using Probabilistic Trajectory Modeling.  MIT, International 
Center for Air Transportation.  Report No. ICAT-2000-2.  May. 
